
The name of the author attracted my attention. For, he has been India’s man in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, known as ‘a walking-talking encyclopedia’ on the people and politics of the region.

Owing to the illustrious background of the author and his assumed professional and intellectual honesty, I spent a big chunk of my monthly savings and took this book home with the expectations that I will get an incisive account of Indo-Pak ties, in peace and war.

To my utter dismay, my expectations were totally shattered. I was shocked and disillusioned to know the author’s disregards for the facts and figures, tended to distort and blend the two in order to suit his interests. In brief I was not only disappointed but have also shattered the Dixit’s image and impression, which I had formed since long.

Every one knows that Dixit is a die-hard Indian, imbued with nationalist spirit. So, one could live with some of his incorrigible prejudices. But it was the absence of intellectual honesty and professional up-righteousness that shocked me the most. Of course no one can contest his right to form and express his opinion. But professional honesty demands that the facts he presents must not be fabricated and distorted otherwise history would lose its sanctity (and the author would be found guilty of spreading falsehood and mischief).

His writings must differentiate him from ordinary Indian propagandist and pseudo-intellectuals. In the subsequent pages I wish to highlight some of the critical deviates made by Dixit in his book to support my contentions and assumptions.

After briefly reviewing the Book, I intend to outline the distorted facts quoted in the book followed by a request to Dixit to re-examine the book in the light of the real facts.
The book is a reverse of sequential survey of the Indo-Pak relations, underpinning mutual antagonism beginning with the last act of violence against India, the hijacking episode of Indian Airlines flight IC-814 flown from Katmandu in December 1999, followed by the Kargil War. Then the author returns to the historical development of Indo-Pakistan tussles from the beginning of partition and beyond, covering the core of conflict, the Kashmir, race for nuclear weapon status, years of coups from 1972 to 1999 and the Lahore Bus diplomacy to Agra Summit and after.

The book is a panoramic survey of the Indo-Pak relations which provides Dixit’s insights into the gridlock as a legacy of history. Purpose for beginning the process of description and analysis in reverse order from the last incident was to instigate the psychological antagonism of a common Indian towards Pakistan. In Dixit’s own words:

“A sequential survey should normally begin at partition, in 1947. .. Such a gradual, logical and chronological approach would, however, diminish the sense of urgency with which India should assess and react to Pakistani antagonism towards India, which in some respects goes beyond territorial disputes like Kashmir or strategic worries about India’s military capacities.” (p19)

“Public memory is remarkably short and its attention span focuses on the immediate past and contemporary results.”(p13)

Mr. Dixit is not only an observer but also an active participant in Indo-Pak rivalry since 1958. He witnessed ‘the Ran of Katch conflict’ and the 1965 War as under-secretary (Pakistan Affairs) in the Indian Foreign Office. He handled with the East Pakistan crisis 1n 1970-1972 as a director special division handling the game for liberation of Bangladesh. As an Ambassador in Pakistan from 1989 to 1991, he saw the reemergence of the movement for Independence of Kashmir from Indian occupation. As ambassador to Pakistan and as a foreign secretary of India, Dixit participated in a series of discussions aimed at normalization of environment in the Indian Subcontinent.

Leaving the true reasons for the failure of Dixit’s reconciliatory efforts to Mr. Dixit conscious, one thing has been established by the on going composite dialogue between both the countries that sincere rapprochement process is not a matter of doves versus hawks but is dictated by the realisation of truth and acceptance of ground realities. Future would decide whether Mr. Dixit’s come back as the National Security Adviser in the Jag Mohan’s government derailes the rapprochement process or leads it to a just and rational conclusion resulting into a prosperous and peaceful South Asia.

Dixit’s version of our mutual antagonism is spread over twelve chapters. Useful annexure covering the Lahore Declaration, the Shimla Agreement and the India-Pakistan Military Balance 2000-2001 add contents and continuity to the book.
The book is a survey of examples from last 55 years asserting to prove Pakistan as a confrontationist state on one hand and India as a peace loving, patience, rational democracy and friendly neighbor on the other.

In short, a praiseworthy artist works, of well groomed nationalist in diplomat dress, having command on playing with the delicate words as he wishes.

I wish that Mr. Dixit should not have taken for granted that the memory of others is as short lived as Indians (he perceived that Indians have short memory. (p13)

Indian hegemonic face is so portrayed at regional canvas that none of the neighbours can claim to be left alone from Indian aggressive and coercive intervention; it may be political, economical, military or Machiavellian.

**FIRST CHAPTER** of the book narrates the chronology of the hijacking episode of the Indian Airliner IC- 814 scheduled for Delhi from Katmandu but forced to Kandhar via Lahore and Dubai. On refusal of permission for landing at Lahore the plane landed at Amritsar. Having fifty minutes stopover at Amritsar, the plane took off for Lahore again but denied once again landing permission from Pakistan. Pakistani authorities agreed only once pilot informed for forced landing due to critical shortage of fuel.

To facilitate rapid move of India’s high commissioner from Islamabad to Lahore, a helicopter was made available. Once refueled the plane took off for Kabul at 10.30 PM but owing to non-availability of night landing facilities diverted to Dubai for a night stay and reached at Kandhar at 8:33 AM on 25th of December.

Despite, absence of official contact or recognition from India, Taliban extended full mediation and logistical support to India at this hour of need. As a result of package deal Indian Foreign Minister brought in person three terrorists (Masood Azhar, Mushtaq Zargar and Omer Sheikh) held in Indian captivity since 1994, for the release of all the hostages. As per deal Taliban allowed the hijackers and released terrorists to leave Afghanistan soil within ten hours.

Dixit points ISI and the Harkat ul Ansar mujahideen behind the scene as revealed by Indian investigations. Masood Azhar after released at Kandhar proceeded to Bahawalpur and announced that remainder terrorists released had gone back to J&K in India.

At the end, Dixit tries to place all burden on the shoulders of Pakistan and Taliban and extricates the Indian Government from showing in competency at Amritsar and bowing before the hijackers demand. Pakistan is blamed for not stopping airliner at Lahore and letting him fly uninterruptedly.

The Airliner was hijacked at about 4:53 PM and landed at Lahore 8:07 PM. For almost 3 hours and fifteen minutes the plane remained within India including 50 minutes parking at Amritsar. Three hours plus time is more
than enough to initiate commando action or any other appropriate measure
to overpower the hijackers.

The matter could have become very clear before the reader if the author
had not ignored answering the following questions.

Why did not Government of India respond with effective action against
the hijackers at Amritsar?

Why the runway was not blocked immediately after the landing of the
plan at Amritsar?

Author could not give any proof that the hijackers were received in
Pakistan or stayed at Afghanistan?

Whereas it was confirmed that the hijackers and two of the released
terrorists went back to the IJK, as the author refers to. (pp26-27 passim)

International Law prohibits arbitrary arrest, requiring charges to be filed
promptly and requires trial or release within a reasonable time. Whereas,
three released persons were never tried or convicted for any act of terrorism,
they were never even charged. All three were arrested in 1994 or earlier, so
the Indian government had enough time to file charges, if it wanted to.

Is such a long negligence not a stark violation of international law, where
these three terrorists detained in Indian captivity for 8-10 years without
even producing before the courts since their arrests?

If these terrorists were having no formal charges, no convictions on
terrorist activity then how can a country arrest his citizen without any
charges?

This was the reason that immediately after the release of Omer Sheikh,
British Foreign Office announced that Ahmad Omer Sheikh is free to return
to Britain, like any other British citizen who faces no criminal charges. Why
not others? If Omer Sheikh can fall back to Britain freely due to absence of
criminal charges against him.

For how long India would keep on blaming the ISI for every wrong done
to India?

So far as the question of retaining airliner at Lahore is concerned,
Pakistan has not forgotten the “Ganga hijacking conspiracy”. If the plane
remained in Pakistan, it could have again got embroiled in a Indian
controversy to implicate Pakistan in hijacking terrorism.

A neutral reader having faith in international law can easily conclude
that three men released (after 8-10 years Indian captivity) in exchange of the
hostages were not terrorists because they were never tried and convicted.

On the contrary, the treatment of such men and others in prison, where
they are likely to be victims of custodial killings, presents a different picture
of the phenomenon of terrorism. All this raises pinching questions, such as:

When a state shoots people on site, or locks them up indefinitely without
due process, promote rampant custodial killings, how is that state
distinguishable from a terrorist organisation? Or
When a state wields deadly violence indiscriminately against guilty and innocent alike, unleashes state terror against the already oppressed people, would it not generate such hatred against itself as to provoke desperate, irrational and dangerous responses. Say of hijacking a plane or suicide bombing.

SECOND CHAPTER is a commentary on the most recent conflict between India and Pakistan in Kargil, which took place along the Line of Control from 6 May to end July 1999. Initially, Mr. Dixit tries to prove that each time Pakistan initiated the confrontation covertly whether it was in Kashmir in 1947-48, in Ran of Kuch in 1965, across international border in 1965 or in former East Pakistan in 1971.

Theme of this chapter is three folds. First, Pakistan’s present ruler General Pervez Musharaf, who is the principal architect of Kargil operation, demonstrates the mindset of an assertive, theologically committed military figure having long-standing links with several Islamic fundamentalist groups (p41).

To prove his thesis, he develops Musharaf’s carrier profile of his own. Some selected features of the Dixit’s review of Musharaf’s profile.

“Like Zia, General Musharaf has strong links with Jamat- e-Islami of Pakistan. While in the ISI, Zia assigned Musharaf to be in charge of training mercenaries recruited to fight against Soviets in Afghanistan. During this period he had contacts with Ossama bin Laden who was brought by CIA in Afghanistan. Besides training mercenaries, Musharaf was also involved in financing their operations with the assistance of narcotics smugglers.” (p38)

“In 1987, he was made brigade commander of Special Service Group raised in Siachin area. He is responsible of massacre and displacement of hundreds of Shiite while suppressing their revolt in Gilgit.” (p39)

“He was appointed the Force Commander Northern Areas, which made him in charge of all military and subversive operation against the Jammu and Kashmir. Musharaf was also directly involved with an unsuccessful military coup against Benazir Bhutto in 1995. The attempt was led by Major General Abbasi, who succeeded Musharaf as force commander, Northern Area.” (pp 39-40)

The aforementioned quotes are so fabricated that a well aware reader gets astonished about the reliability of Mr. Dixit sources of data. For those who are not aware about the facts, let me sift the truth from falsehood.

General Musharaf, throughout his carrier, has never been known as theologically committed military figure but, a moderate, enlightened man with extremely liberal outlook.

He never served in ISI in any capacity and has never been involved in operation in Afghanistan. The basis for establishment of his links with
Islamic fundamentalist fighters, as outlined by the author are self-made and far from truth.

General Musharaf never served in Siachin in any capacity, what to talk of brigade commander of the SSG brigade there.

He has never been the Force Commander Northern Area. Thus he has no involvement in Kashmir operations or Mujahideens as concluded by the author.

How bold the author is in portraying falsehood as truth, when he declares that General Abbasi took over from him as a Force Commander Northern Area, whereas, Musharaf has never been on that appointment.

I could not understand ulterior motives of the author, as to why he puts in so many false statements one after the other to prove Musharaf as devout Islamic fundamentalist. Probably he wished to take benefits of post 9/11 anti-fundamentalist scenario and contemplate Pakistan as a rogue or fundamentalist state due to its rulers. With due respect to the author I would request him to please bring a new edition of his book forthwith after tearing off this story of Musharaf. Otherwise one would not go beyond page 40 of his book.

After formulation of Musharaf profile, the author touches the geo-strategic significance of Kargil, which in his views might have prompted Pakistan’s military adventurism. Kargil is a region of undoubted significance for the security of valley, Ladakh and our military positions on the Siachin. Therefore, “if Pakistan could capture the Kargil area it could interdict the highway from the valley to Ladakh and cut off Indian approach both to Ladakh and Siachin.” (p45)

Dixit evaluates, the Kargil war as a continuation of the unalterable objective of the Pakistani power structure to wrest Kashmir from India forcibly. In his view, the single factor propelling Kargil war was the Jihadi personality of war mongering army chief, General Pervez Musharaf, “Who believed that a sustained campaign of subversion and military intrusion would result in Pakistan achieving its objective of annexing Kashmir.”(p38) Pakistan’s claim that Kargil did not involve regular troops, but only mujahideen was negated by the fact that “irregulars, barring foreign mercenaries, were used as porters and logistical support personnel by the Pakistan army”. (p51)

Again, disappointingly for those who imagine that people-to-people relations are the panacea for the India-Pakistan conflict, “Pakistani public opinion (except in Pakistan-administered Kashmir) swallowed government propaganda during Kargil that the misadventure was “launched substantially by Kashmiri militants”. (p75)

The author refers a lot to Subrahmanyam Report, which is a 228 pages comprehensively detailed survey of military account, reasons for failure of intelligence to detect Pakistani intrusion for almost about 8 months and suggest measures to avoid repetition of such fiasco in future again. It is
heartening to see Dixit’s treatment of the K. Subrahmanyam led Kargil Review Committee Report, as his objective analysis on the report hold back nothing in pointing out its short coming. In his view “same amount of attention were not given to the role of the armed forces as was given to the IB or RAW”. (p59)

Much of its input came from serving defence sources that, as per the rules, are forbidden to speak. They also work in a watertight compartmentalized environment even at the best of times. There has been a “deliberate reticence” in the report in highlighting the failures and shortcomings in the senior command structure in the Northern Command. Only Brigadier Surinder Singh, Commander of the Kargil Brigade, was singled out in the report "for failing to make correct assessments and not having initiated relevant anticipatory action" (p58). A former vice chief of army staff, Lt. General Moti Dhar, aptly sums up when he says:

“The intrusion in Kargil was a national shame and hence accountability for such a blunder needs to be pinpointed if we are to assure the security of nation in future. This negligence has cost the nation (Indian) approximately five thousands crores rupees, heavy causalities to our troops and above all a shadow has fallen on the honour of the nation.” (p86)

Any one in uniform would have known that, in addition to Brig Singh, the entire pecking order from the Divisional Commander, the Corps Commander, the Northern Army Commander, and even the then Chief of the Army Staff, should have been asked to explain their acts of omission or commission in the failure of intelligence at Kargil. Their command responses at the time, especially during the initial stages of the war, were far from satisfactory. Only one poor Brigadier was packed off home speaks volumes of the failing standards in accountability and degrading moral standards of taking the responsibility or blame as a senior. Such incidents also show the true worth of review committee report, which will always fail to instill confidence within and outside the armed forces.

The author also projects the story of winning Indian diplomatic management during the Kargil crisis and failure of Pakistani diplomatic corps.

While narrating international reaction to the situation the author points out that:

- D-8 except Japan blamed Pakistan on violating the Line of Control and termed restoration of respect for LoC as an essential pre-condition to end the conflict and defuse tension.
- Saudi Arabia was openly supportive of Pakistan and it was Prince Bandar bin Sultan who convinced Pakistan to pull back to its side.
- None of the SAARC country articulated a clear value judgment about the origin of war.

Author concludes the Kargil episode:
“The end result of the Kargil experience is that Indian public opinion is clear that Pakistan will continue its hostile activities against India and that India had to remain permanently alert.” (p77)

I view more Kargil wars might crop up if India remains adamant on Kashmir issue and failed to resolve it in a just and fair manner. Prime Minister of Pakistan rightly said on 12th July 1999 in Pakistan National Assembly:

“Though the volcanic eruption in Kargil has been brought under control, if India doesn’t discuss Kashmir in meaningful manner, other volcanoes will erupt”.

WHILE EXPLAINING the ‘Wellsprings of Antagonism’ in chapter four, Mr. Dixit terms Indo-Pakistani rivalry as a historical legacy similar to Israeli-Palestinian struggle. Theories of Muslim separatism and antipathy to “Hindu India” date back to the 17 century battle of succession between Dara Shikoh and Aurangzeb. Thus Muslim assertiveness and Hindu resentment dating from the period of Aurangzeb bore the seeds of Hindu- Muslim antagonism. (p101)

Roots of this antagonism were further strengthened by the divide- and rule policy of the British wherein Muslim community was left comparatively backward and politically neglected/ powerless.

Dixit thinks that the mid of the 19th century, the crumbling moment of Muslim political power before the British onslaught, raised anxiety among undivided India's Muslim intellectuals. The operational styles of Tilak and Gandhi, crystallised suspicions about the Hindu majority in the psyche of Indian Muslims.

“The average middle-class Muslims did not understand the profound sophistication of Mahatma Gandhi’s approach to build an Indian national identity. ‘Ram Rajya’ to the average Muslim was a prescription for Hindu domination. It was considered an attempt at diluting the unique qualities of Islam for political ends by a deeply religious Hindu Leader.” (p104)

Partition and its attendant horrors were “seeds of communal antagonism, sown over the previous 50 to 90 years, which were sprouting through the ground as poisonous saplings.” (p108) The moment Pakistan's founding father Muhammad Ali Jinnah complained of receiving a “moth-eaten and truncated Pakistan” in 1947, the seeds of hostility based in religion took on territorial identity. General Akbar Khan, who led the Afridi invasion of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947, has caused untold bloodshed for 55 years:

“The accession of Kashmir to Pakistan was not simply a matter of desirability but an absolute necessity for Pakistan's separate existence.” (p114)

Existing contradictions were compounded from 1958 by a “major ideological chasm” with India's commitment to democracy and Pakistan's
transformation into a military-bureaucratic authoritarian state. Field Marshall Ayub Khan’s era was characterised by ups and downs in bilateral relations, with a few positive elements like the Indus Waters Treaty and proposals for a mutual defense pact, but a steep escalation in Pakistani war plans over Kashmir.

Then foreign minister (later Prime Minister) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s basic hypothesis that the Kashmiri people would rise in support of guerrillas and the Pakistan army in the 1965 war fell flat as locals supplied steady information about infiltration routes and hiding places to the Indian army. Pakistan’s usage of code names such as “Operation Gibraltar” (in memory of the Arab invasion of Gibraltar in AD 711) “appeals to the collective historical and assertive Islamic memory of a conquest nearly a thousand years earlier” did not shake the basic secular fabric of India in 1965. (Is India really maintaining secular fabric since 1947 till today? Such as Prithvi, Suriya, Ashoke, Agni, Naag, Tirshol, etc. is secular in nature and has nothing to do Indian religious/historical myths).

However Chinese ultimatums and diplomatic pressure prevented a decisive result favorable in the war. Despite this all, Indian premier Lal Bahadur Shastri made further strategic concessions of returning back Haji Pir, Kargil and Uri-Poonch to Pakistan at Tashkent. But, Pakistani public opinion was inflamed by Bhutto slamming the peace agreement as a “surrender and a betrayal”. The period between 1960 and 1971 saw relations drifting into somnolent hostility.

I think Mr. Dixit do not know any thing about the “Sunder Ji’s (Indian army chief in 1980s) mechanisation plan which eaten up more then 15 billion dollars of Indian exchequer. Acquisition of fleet of T-72 main battle tanks from USSR, armed personnel carriers, Mig-21, 27, 29 and Su-30K aircrafts, aircraft carrier, manufacturing of Vajanta and Arjun tanks, maintaining armada of surface to surface and surface to air missiles, conversion of mountain divisions into RAPIDS and Mechanized brigades/divisions and raising of Air Assault Divisions and so on; speaks for what? This all mechanization is against whom? China border is of rugged mountain and Bangladesh terrain is revering in nature, third side is of Indian Ocean; all three are unsuitable for employment of armored/mechanised forces, only Pakistan’s southern border presents a suitable terrain for employment of mechanized forces. Thus no side of the border suits for mechanized forces but only Pakistan which has been the long outstanding intended target of Indian hegemonic agenda”.

Against such unprecedented mechanization Pakistan’s acquisition of few weapons does not justify Mr. Dixit critic.

‘THE BREAK-UP OF PAKISTAN’. While describing the events leading to the break up of Pakistan, Dixit argues that the seeds of Bangladesh movement picked up momentum with the 1970 election resulting into a land slide victory to
Mujib’s Awami League and Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party emerging as second in the National Assembly.

Mujib’s priority was drafting of new constitution providing decentralization of power and autonomy for the constituent units of Pakistan as vision in his six-point program. Since Mujib has no representation in West Pakistan, therefore, the proposed constitution was most likely to be devoid of aspirations of West Pakistanis.

Bhutto wanted a substantial share in the Government on one hand and Yahya has his personal interest of continuing the perks as far as possible. Bhutto’s non-cooperative attitude prevented Yahya from timely setting in motion the convening of the National Assembly and creating a democratic government in Pakistan. Bhutto accused the Awami League of Mujibur Rehman to be a “pro-Hindu organization that was going to affect the Islamic identity of Pakistan through incorporating the six-point autonomy provision into the proposed constitution”. (p172)

By March 1971, all governmental activities came to standstill with protest against postponing the convening of the National Assembly and the delay in installing Mujib as Prime Minister. Yahya-Mujib and Bhutto negotiations started in mid March. Still negotiations were in progress, when Mujib made his famous speech ‘The struggle now is for liberation and self rule; the struggle this time is for independence’. (p175) Resultantly, the negotiations failed, and “military crack down initiated from 25th March 1971.

Few of the following glimpses from Mr. Dixit would suffice to clarify peace loving India role in dismemberment of its neighbor.

“Mujib was arrested on 27th March whereas, the most of the Awami League leadership escaped to India.” (p178)

“An independent Government of Bangladesh was established on the Indian soil and the location of Government was named Mujibnagar ...” (p179)

“The Mujibnagar Government operating from Indian border was provided with headquarters at 18, Comac Street in Calcutta. The Ministry of External Affairs opened a full fledged secretariat in Calcutta to liaise with Mujibnagar Government.” (p180)

“The second move was to give refuge to the military and paramilitary personnel who had escaped.” (p180)

“The resistance groups captured armories ... and treasuries at various district. Having acquired this money they sought Indian assistance, which was given, to convert a portion of these resources into foreign exchange for purchasing essential communications equipment and other items needed to carry on their struggle.” (p181)

“Mrs. Gandhi’s initial and instinctive reaction was to give immediate recognition to a free Bangladesh and to back the
liberation struggle and the resistance movement with full military support. . . .

When Mrs. Gandhi consulted Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram and Army Chief General Manekshaw, both of them reportedly told her that while India could exercise her military option, a precipitate military campaign in the summer and monsoon months might create problems and delay the successful completion of the campaign. Mankeshaw expressed the view that he should be allowed sufficient time to prepare the Indian armed forces for deployment against Pakistan.” (p182)

Over here one cannot resist to inquire from Mr Dixit that “do the above quotes from his own book not suffice to reveal the true Indian vicious designs/conspirtory role in dismembe rment of Pakistan. If all this was morally justified then why doesn’t India apply the same rule for Kasmiris, Sikh, Naga Landers and Sikim freedom fighters?

At Simla, Bhutto pleaded with Mrs. Gandhi not to publicly disclose his commitment to convert the LoC into a de jure border over three to five years, but quickly reneged on the oral promise by starting a covert nuclear program in 1974 and embarking on a grand strategic Islamic alliance to counter India's influence and stature in Asian, West Asian and Gulf politics. Most ominously, “Bhutto was accurate in this perception about Mujib's subconscious Islamic inclinations and innate reservations about India.” (p 231)

While crowds jostled around Bhutto’s car on his first state visit to independent Bangladesh, shouting “Bhutto Zindabad” and “Pakistan-Bangladesh friendship Zindabad”, Dixit, who was the Indian High Commissioner, was harassed and booed with anti-India slogans.

The Islamisation and anti-India postures of Bangladesh reached full crescent with Zia ur Rehman’s military coup and have not ceased ever since.

FROM ZIA TO MUSHARRAF. General Zia ul Haq planned refashioning of India-Pakistan relations in a manner whereby compromises made by Pakistan since 1971 could be reversed.

He had a two-prong policy from 1981 onwards, “An apparent peace offensive, while encouraging covert moves to erode India's unity, influence and strength”. (p248) Pakistan established connections with extremist Sikhs in Punjab for fomenting the Khalistan movement against India. Concurrent with the total Islamisation of Pakistani society, Zia appointed himself a spokesman for Indian Muslims, claiming “my heart bled for them when they are victimized”. Dixit’s riposte to Islamabad that India was engaging in “uncivilized behavior” against minorities is that “this criterion should be suitably applied to Muslim rulers, beginning from Mahmud Ghaznavi to Aurangzeb and latter-day rulers of Pakistan”. (p 254)

Operation Brasstacks (1987), the nearest the two sides had come to war since 1971, was a classic example of the heightened mistrust between India and Pakistan. Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan’s “revelation”
to Kuldip Nayar in March 1987 that Pakistan possessed the atomic bomb was an orchestrated attempt of coercive diplomacy by Zia, further warning India that Pakistan was going the nuclear route to change the dynamics of the Kashmir issue. Zia also used nukes to develop South Asian allies, telling them that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capacity served the purpose not only of its own security but also to save the smaller neighbors from Indian hegemony.

Benazir Bhutto took Rajiv Gandhi’s genuine desire to improve relations as his weakness and hoped that she could get him to compromise on the Kashmir issue in December 1988. When Rajiv firmly stood by India’s interests, Benazir stepped up clandestine activities inside Indian Kashmir. Benazir’s highly militant and aggressive postures on Kashmir led to speculation about a new war in 1990, which was the first instance of American diplomatic mediation through the Gates mission of what could have been a nuclear confrontation.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif sent positive signals to India assuring that he would give way to “change in the ground situation” (read cessation of armed support to mujahideen). But, Dixit says, “regardless of their political affiliations, Pakistani leaders remain prisoners of an all-embracing anti-Indianness”. (p282)

Dixit recounts Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad “reminding” Nawaz Sharif in 1997 before Indian premier Inder Kumar Gujral that a proposed gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Pakistan to India “could not be undertaken as there would be opposition from Pakistani public opinion unless the Kashmir problem was resolved first”. (p301)

From 1992-93, Pakistan’s rhetoric on Kashmir shifted from “self-determination” to “violations of human rights by Indian security forces”, allegations, which were effectively rebutted at various world forums by Dixit and his successor foreign secretaries. Indian governments, in 1990s, successfully presented Islamic terrorism emanating from Pakistan as the core problem, and not the human rights. In the late 1990s, the Gujral Doctrine did not yield any quid pro quo from Pakistan, leading Dixit to comment, “The doctrine was not rooted in reality”. India’s conduction of Shakti series of nuclear weapons tests on 11 and 13 May followed by highly assertive statements by Indian Home minister L.K. Advani and minister Madan Lal Khurana, threatening of Pre-emptive strikes against and “Pakistan will now be taught a lesson”. (p302)

On seeing weak international reaction to Indian test, Pakistan had no other option but to follow the suit by conducting nuclear weapons tests at the Chaghi hills on May 27. Much heralded, Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore in February 1999 was welcomed in a subdued manner by the less enthusiastic Pakistani public. (p303) Islam-pasand parties washed entire platform of his visit to Minar-i-Pakistan, in a public ceremony “to purify it from the malign impact of the visit of an infidel prime minister of the enemy country”. (p304)
The relevance of the visit was further drowned in the quagmire of the Kargil conflict with in two and half months leaving fabric of Indo- Pak relations in complete-tatters.

**PSYCHOLOGICAL HURDLES TO NORMALISATION.** Towards the conclusion, Dixit identifies a series of Pakistani traits that refuse to live amicably with India.

First, “artificially nurtured memories of Muslim superiority and a subconscious desire to rectify the unfair arrangements of partition”.

Second, certain envy Pakistanis would not acknowledge openly about the failure of their civil society to solidify democratic and tolerant traditions in comparison to an India where khakis and bayonets follow popularly elected representatives.

Third, assumption by Pakistan of the role of protector and overseer of the welfare of Indian Muslims, who in the words of Maulana Azad, could be exploited from forces across the border owing to their “socio-political schizophrenia” since partition.

Fourth, avenging the military defeat of 1971, which is a formal objective declared in the official oath-taking ceremony of every Pakistani officer-cadet when he graduates.

Fifth, irrational faith in the “profound capacity for commitment to jihad amongst the momin”, as was publicly declared by Foreign Minister Gauhar Ayub Khan at a press conference in Delhi.

Sixth, confidence that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is an instrumentality to further geopolitical objectives in Kashmir.

Seventh, widespread belief in the Pakistani establishment and media circles that India is getting exhausted in Kashmir and would not be able to hold on to it for long (a presumption of Musharraf in Kargil).

Eighth, most significantly, “the unarticulated ambition and hope that if India broke up, Pakistan will emerge as the strongest and most powerful political entity in South Asia”. (p392)

For all the Vajpayee government’s “bold and dramatic” initiatives since 1998 to break the log jam with Pakistan (the latest Agra Summit of 2001, incidentally, was L. K. Advani’s brainchild, according to Dixit), unless there is an alteration of the above eight fault lines, no permanent peace can be expected. Unless there is a “fundamental transformation of the power structure in Pakistan, not only in terms of its military components but also of the social background and political inclinations of the plutocratic and feudal leadership” (p437), the “ever-ever” antagonism will persist.

Dixit’s tone is decidedly an Indian version of the causes, symptoms and course of India-Pakistan fencing. However, personal impressions he packs into this book will make it a bias and partial literature which seems more close to a propaganda pamphlet than a reference guide for students of South Asian history and politics. If Indian politicians understood as much as Dixit about Pakistan, then the ongoing peace process/composite dialogue my not
reach to conclusion and weather remain dye for succeeding generation for unforeseeable future.

**SUGGESTIONS**

THE BOOK has lot of space to absorb the missing links in chronology of events leading to war and peace between both the neighbors. Mentioning of entire facts file here may lead to this review into a book size therefore, I will restrict my self to very few glimpses unearthing Indian true intentions/violations towards Pakistan. India has not only sought to negate bilateral commitments entered into with Pakistan, as and when it suited its interests, it has been equally cavalier with its multilateral treaty commitments.

I am sure that if few of the following are arranged at their appropriate places in the book than the students of South Asia may be able to see the picture as it actually emerges on the canvas:

In 1947, Nehru family prevailed over Mountbatten in getting the Radcliffe boundary award changed by giving Gurdaspur district (Ferozpur and Zira tehsils, which had the Muslim majority of 55 and 65 percent respectively), a Muslim majority area, to India (Christopher Beaumont, private secretary to Radcliffe, said in his testimony made available in 1992). He did this to provide India with an access route to Kashmir. The Beaumont testimony finds confirmation (if ever needed) in the book Reminiscences of an Engineer written by Dr Kanwar Sain, chief engineer (irrigation) of the Bikaner State in 1947 (Dr Kanwar Sain recounts how and why Mountbatten gave Ferozpur to India.

Among other things, Mountbatten wanted to deprive Pakistan of the big ordnance depot located in Ferozpur. That would have strengthened Pakistan’s military muscle against India). This conspiracy against Pakistan has become a core irritant having ever lasted impact on South Asian stability and in the foreseeable future, South Asia would experience a condition of ugly stability—that is, the persistence of unconventional conflicts.

In 1947 India began its membership of the international comity of sovereign states by capturing the princely states of Hyderabad and Junagadh through the use of force and tried to do the same to Jammu and Kashmir.

Refusal of handing over the agreed division of assets, both financial and military to Pakistan. All of the armament factories were retained by India and none was handed over to Pakistan.

India's denial of the right of plebiscite to the Kashmiris is a constant violation of UN Security Council resolutions and the UN Charter which includes: “The members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter (Article 25, UN Charter).”
It transgressed the UN Charter's letter and spirit when it invaded Goa in 1961 and expanded India's geographic contours.

Amalgamation of Sikkim within the Indian state (from the status of a protectorate) violated the spirit of International Law. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) upholds the sanctity of international treaties and conventions and *inter alia* states that successor state (which India was after 1947 to British India, and gained its UN seat on that basis) inherits treaty obligations of the predecessor state as well.

After the 1971 war with Pakistan, India violated the Geneva Conventions-1949 relating Prisoners of War. She continued to hold on of Pakistani POWs long after the war had ended and Pakistan had returned the Indian POWs.

India began violating the Simla Accord relating specifically to the Line of Control since 1972, almost as soon as it was signed. Despite a commitment by both Pakistan and India not to alter the LoC unilaterally and to refrain from using force “in violation of this Line”, India crossed over the post-1971 LoC number of time and set up 6-8 posts on Pakistan's side of this line.

Testing a nuclear device in 1974, India certainly violated the spirit of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 to which it was a party - even though it may not have violated the letter of this treaty.

In 1984, Indian occupation of Siachen Glacier and its two key northern passes--Bila Fond La and Sia La is not only violation of the Simla Accord but also the Karachi Agreement of 1949. Status of Siachen Glacier as an integral part of Baltistan in the Northern Areas of Pakistan was clearly reflected in international maps. Furthermore, all international mountaineering and trekking expeditions to the Siachen area had to apply to the Pakistan government for permission since 1949.

1988, India violated the Simla Accord once again in the unoccupied Qamar sector by crossing the LoC and establishing 12 posts (next to Kargil Sector). Such routine violations of the Simla Accord really call into question the validity of this accord today.

Violation of the Pakistan-India 1992 Agreement on Chemical Weapons whereby both sides agreed not to acquire, develop, produce, or use chemical weapons. At the time of signing of the agreement both Pakistan and India declared that they did not possess chemical weapons' stockpiles. However, when India ratified the international Chemical Weapons Convention in 1996, it declared a large stockpile of chemical weapons. This testifies that Indian ill designs and evil minded deception towards Pakistan while signing the bilateral agreement on chemical weapons in the first place.

During the Kargil crisis India also violated the Law of the Sea Convention when it held up a North Korean cargo ship that was carrying a cargo of 300 crates destined for Pakistan, at Kandla Port, arrested crew and confiscated cargo. Given that India had not declared war on Pakistan,
legally it had no ground on which to carry out any of these acts in peacetime.

Interestingly, India has been very harsh with weak states and has forcibly imposed bilateral agreements to make them compliant to Indian national interests. For instance, land-locked Nepal suffered the wrath of India when it purchased a few anti-aircraft guns from China (a defensive weapon system in any case). India choked Nepal economically by withholding transit facilities.

With such an abysmal track record on bilateral and multilateral agreements and treaties, one wonders how and why India continues to escape international censure. It really negates the relevance of international commitments and lends further credence to the belief that at the end of the day it is force (primarily military) and fraud that define international politics even today.

The past 55 years are replete with examples where, India talked peace while expanding its territories through military means--be it the princely states of British India or Goa or Sikkim or Siachin, or Sri Lanka.

Enduring conflict since 1947 has exhausted both India and Pakistan and neither nation has been able to achieve a decisive victory. Though late, there are some indications, that both the nations have realized the necessity of peace and normalization in the region.

In order to translate this desire for peace into a reality, India has to demonstrate through her deeds that she has shunned her hegemonic psyche and coercive approach. India must realise that prosperity of South Asians including Indians lay in peace and harmony and not in confrontation.

Of course, peace cannot be realised without fair play and justice an amicable settlement of lingering dispute. The prospects for enduring peace depend whether there are enough stakeholders in Pakistan and India to promote in a relationship geared towards peace. The Kashmir problem would continue to defy solution unless substantial creative and judicious thinking is employed.