

COLD WAR POLITICS OF SUPERPOWERS IN SOUTH ASIA

A. Z. Hilali¹

Abstract

South Asia is a most complex, volatile and politically explosive region and it remains the most enigmatic and baffling in the world. It is also one of the most socially divided and fertile regions. The region of South Asia mainly consists of seven states: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. It is home to 1.4 billion people, more than 20 percent of the world population. Thus, about one-fifth of humanity lives between the western reaches of Afghanistan and Pakistan on one side and the eastern reaches of Bangladesh and India on the other. It is a region that lies between the sea routes of the Indian Ocean (Persian Gulf and the Asia-Pacific) and the land routes of Central Asia connecting Europe to the East. It is a large reservoir of natural and human resources, making it a prime destination for finance capital, a lucrative market for trade and a source of cheap raw material. It also sits at the confluence of the richest sources of oil, gas, rubber, manganese, copper, gold, tea, cotton, rice and jute and is the transit point for most of the resources and manufactures that criss-cross the world. Moreover, it is the most heavily militarized and bureaucratized zone in the world and it has a variety of complex and violent primordial ethnic groups.

Historically, South Asia had been the finest passage of invaders from Central Asia, Persia, the Arab world and even Greece for thousands of years. Later, the region was colonized first by the Muslims and then by the European powers and ultimately it comes under the suzerainty of British Empire. Thus, British India was the base from which England projected its power towards China and Russia as part of the infamous "Great Game" in the 19th century. The region saw the rise of central state institutions more than two thousand years ago and there is a continuous history of the rise and fall of civilizations and accompanying social-political institutions and ideologies. In terms of geopolitics, the South Asian region has traditionally been looked at as a unified entity. The region is Indo-centric and all other seven countries of South Asia are located around India, without any mutual geographic contiguity.

SUPERPOWERS POLITICS IN SOUTH ASIA

South Asia has been a region of great importance to the industrialized democracies -and specifically the United States. The region has always been an arena where great power competition has been played and managed. It is, of course, possible to argue that the primary significance of the states of South Asia lies in their role in the competition between the United States, the Soviet Union and China for global and regional influence. The region has been recognized as a geographical area of major strategic significance through, which the routes connecting Europe, Africa and Asia. The region of South Asia is important because of its connection with the vital sea-lines of communication in the Indian Ocean and is sandwiched between two politically volatile and economically critical regions i.e., the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia.² Thus, South Asia forms an integral part of Mackinder's "World Island," that is, the Euro-African-Asiatic land mass, the most important single geographical unit in the world.³ Moreover, the major actors of the region, India and Pakistan, were divided in terms of polarisation between the United States, the Soviet Union and China. In this context, India has functioned as an important ally of the Soviet Union and Pakistan has functioned as a broker for the West in relation to moderate Muslim countries in the Middle East and the Gulf areas and in relation to China.

US Interest in South Asia Since 1945

The United States' involvement in South Asia has fluctuated, depending upon its intensity and style of competition with other great powers at the global level. In reality, South Asia is an area about which Americans knew little, where they have few interests, and which is always low on the scale of the US priorities.⁴ The United States did not become an imperialist nation in South Asia, but it replaced Britain as the principal Western power of the

region and watched with interest as the British played the “Great Game” against Russia, trying to block czarist expansion through the northwest (Khyber Pass) into South Asia. The US strategic interests and perspective regarding South Asia, from the very beginning, were strongly influenced by the British who wanted the US to assume the role of a successor hegemon in the area but also sought to guide the US to lead the world and control the strategic zones. Olaf Caroe, the well-known British strategist, admitted that the British advised the US about the protection of Western interests in the Gulf and South Asia.⁵ In fact, the United States is not an Asian power and it has no common borders with the countries of South Asia and has no territorial interest in the region. South Asia is not even a major trading partner of the US and its investment in the area is negligible.⁶ The principal determinant of US policy towards South Asia has been the US perception of the region’s relevance to the pursuit of its global geopolitical and strategic goals. Moreover, the US policy in South Asia has been shaped not so much with reference to the interests of the states of the region but based on US interests vs. Soviet Union and China. Therefore, the major American interest was to prevent the absorption of the area into the communist orbit. The early thrust was against advancing communism in general; and later, the emphasis was confined to Soviet expansionism after the Sino-US rapprochement.

The political involvement of the United States in South Asia is a relatively recent phenomenon. It started only after World War II, from which the United States emerged as a leading world power. Before that time, there had been only limited commercial and cultural links dating back to the nineteenth century. The American Tobacco Company (ATC) engaged in tobacco trade with the South Asian states, and a number of American archaeologists, anthropologists, students of ancient history, educators and missionaries were attracted by the region’s unique cultural, religious and historical aspects.⁷ These socio-cultural, religious and academic groups were the main contacts

between the United States and South Asia in the early modern period. The end of the British rule over the world, especially the withdrawal from South Asia to East of Suez brought the United States into the region to help its embattled ally, Great Britain, and the area ceased to be European sphere of influence.⁸ Their eclipse marked a corresponding rise in status for the United States and the Soviet Union and materialization of a bipolar global power configuration. The combination of the region's natural resources including Gulf oil and its strategic geopolitical position put it squarely in the middle of the ideological political struggle between East and West.

Moreover, the US policy toward South Asia was basically confused, inconsistent and reactive rather than calculated, long term, and innovative due, to internal American factors, including periodic changes in administrations. The factors of oil and Zionist nationalism which involve the US in the Middle East had no corollary in South Asia. In fact, the absence of material interest has helped to limit American involvement in the region and it has been determined largely by factors extraneous to the area. Moreover, the United States had been guided in its South Asian policy by its global interests and has therefore tended to view regional conflicts largely from a global perspective.⁹ Thus, it is also clear that most of the US actions and reactions were congruent with global considerations; the periodic modification of US regional policy to suit its global pursuits appeared to local states as a confused policy, lacking clarity and coherence in its declaratory and operational dimensions.

Political Interests

After the World War II the communist threat seemed more menacing and it was utmost need that the United States must lead the world. Europe, Asia and Africa all were economically and militarily weak and politically unstable. Britain was no more capable of world leadership and only the United States was powerful enough to challenge the emerging threats in the bipolar

international structure of the world. In the situation, the US abandoned its traditional policy of “isolationism” and assumed the leadership of the “free world,” embarked upon a global strategy of anti-communism.¹⁰ In fact, the US anti-communist strategy began in 1947 with the Truman Doctrine of containment in which he committed to “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure.”¹¹ Its architect, George F. Kennan, postulated that “the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world....can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence.”¹²

After the introduction of containment policy, the US first turned its attention to Europe through the Marshall Plan (1947) and later American strategists abruptly set out to extend the policy of containment to Asia. Turkey has already been fortified by the Truman doctrine and the NATO pact in 1949. In 1952 the Truman administration signed bilateral defence treaties with several states such as Thailand, Taiwan, the Philippines and Japan. But one of the few Asian countries that reacted to the American search for allies with avid interest was Pakistan which was eagerly searching for international friends in order to counter Indian threat. Historically, the US entered the subcontinent principally by way of the Middle East and Southeast Asia to protect the interests of industrialised nations. A degree of natural affinity between Pakistan and its Western neighbours was part of the reason; more important, however, was Washington’s mechanical concept of containment that required a chain of contiguous allies around the perimeter of the Sino-Soviet bloc. Moreover, the US policy of strategic distance from India was based on the US assessment of India’s prospective role and capabilities that were seen as incompatible with the overall Western requirements in the region. India’s image in the eyes of US future planners was that it was not capable of

providing leadership to Southeast Asia in the struggle against communism. Pakistan, in their perceptions, appeared well placed to deal with its problems. In this context, the policy makers of the State Department on 3 April 1950 said:

. . . it may in time become desirable critically to review our concept that Pakistan's destiny is or should be bound with India. . . the schism that led to the break-up of the old India was very deep. . . The development of a Pakistan-India entente cordiale appears remote. Moreover, the vigour and methods which have characterized India's execution of its policy of consolidating the princely states and its inflexible attitude with regard to Kashmir may indicate national traits which in time, if not controlled, could make India Japan's successor in Asiatic imperialism. In such a circumstance a strong Muslim block under the leadership of Pakistan and friendly to the US might afford a desirable balance of power in Asia.¹³

Thus, the US interests in South Asia have been to prevent the domination of Asia by a single power which might constitute a threat to the United States and to assist South Asian countries to develop economically and as relatively open societies.¹⁴ The US officials made it clear that the denial interest refers to the communist nations; the free world was to be protected from communism whether it be of the Russian, Chinese or some other variety and Pakistan will be an integral part of the denial plans.¹⁵ The development interest has also been rationalized in terms of anti-communism. For example, a statement by James Killen, formally the US economic aid director in Pakistan, makes this apparent. While Killen's discussion of helping Pakistan ultimately become self-sufficient shows some altruism, the thrust of Killen statement deals with providing sufficient economic aid to enable Pakistan to fulfill its military commitments. Moreover, the American policy makers argues that the United States has a vital interest in insuring Pakistan's independence and its continuing alignment with the free world in collective security against communism. It is therefore, necessary to help Pakistan to maintain a military

force capable of meeting this threat, to maintain levels of economic activity and standards of living capable of supporting US interests in South Asia.¹⁶

It was clear that a policy of containment of communism in Southeast and Southwest Asia predominated in the US approach and they found Pakistan more comfortable for US strategic interests as compared to India. Pakistan's assets, such as its religious identity with the Muslim countries of Middle East, its geographical proximity to the oil-rich Persian Gulf and to the communist adversaries like the Soviet Union and China, and above all its potential and willingness to act as a regional balancer to India were indeed tempting.¹⁷ There was also general feeling by the American policy makers that by extending military assistance, Pakistan's friendship could be won and its opposition to the communist nations strengthened. Olaf Caroe, a former Governor of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan and Foreign Secretary of the British-Indian government, openly indicated to the Americans in his book *Wells of Power*, that Western defence of the Middle East should be based on Pakistan, just as British defence of the Middle East had previously been based upon control of the subcontinent.¹⁸ The United States also realised that with Pakistan the Middle East could be defended and without Pakistan it would be difficult to do so.¹⁹

Thus, Pakistan is the only country in South Asia and within Muslim world which participated in all of the US led military alliances in the 1950s. This was a time when Pakistan was becoming increasingly anxious to obtain US military and economic assistance without antagonizing the Soviet Union and China. In general, Pakistan's purpose in joining the alliances was not to contain communism but to strengthen its own defence and bargaining position vis-à-vis India, its arch adversary.²⁰ Therefore, Pakistan became an ally of the West in May 1954, when the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the United States was signed. Later, Pakistan became a member of SEATO²¹ and

the Baghdad Pact (later known as CENTO²²) in 1954-55 led to a close military relationship with the US and Washington had a chance to establish military bases in order to protect the oil areas of the Middle East.²³ In 1959, Pakistan also signed a bilateral “Agreement of Co-operation” with the United States and Pakistan was associated with the US through not one, but four mutual security arrangements.²⁴ *The New York Times* stated that discussions on a military alliance were to begin on the condition that Pakistan “was willing to consider an exchange of air bases for military equipment.”²⁵ Moreover, the Pakistan military elites, especially General Ayub Khan, constantly pressed for larger allotments of arms and economic aid. His arguments were supported by many US officials who, convinced that Pakistan had adopted a firm anti-Communist policy, argued that it could only play a role in regional defence if it were given more arms than originally planned.²⁶ Policy makers seemingly believed that Pakistan assessed the Soviet military pressure as a significant danger, which made cooperation with the West desirable. In fact, some important officials apparently thought that Pakistan regarded the Soviet threat as a close second to that posed by India. Thus, Pakistan did become a member of Western military pacts and was sometimes regarded as ‘America’s most allied ally in Asia’ and managed the problem of survival from the implacable hostility of India. Political analyst Nirad Chaudhuri quite logically argued that “India held the pistol at the head of Pakistan, until, in 1954, the American alliance delivered the country from the nightmare.”²⁷ Under the influence of the alliance policy, Pakistan felt it had clearly come off better than India in a major international episode, and it was sweet to savor.²⁸

Therefore, military alliances with Pakistan became a strategic necessity and the US acquired an image in India “as a friend of Pakistan and opposed to India.”²⁹ Some Indian scholars argued that the US attitude towards India has allowed India to believe that the US patronisation of Pakistan meant denial of

proper status to India.³⁰ Moreover, the US military aid to Pakistan alienated India and pushed it toward the Soviet Union. Subsequently, India's willingness to expand relations with the Communist countries enhanced their international stature and made other Asian countries more receptive to Soviet overtures. The Soviet Union backing of India vis-à-vis Pakistan strengthened New Delhi's resolve to stand firm on Kashmir rather than seek a compromise, just as the alliance with the United States encouraged Pakistan to think it might succeed in pressuring India to be more accommodating. Thus, within a decade of independence the two major nations of the region were caught up in the Cold War and their involvement in great-power politics enabled them to extract material benefits.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s the United States almost withdrew from South Asian affairs. The US adopted neutral stance between the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and 1971 and terminated military aid to both countries, which hurt Pakistan more than India. The US neutrality made the Pakistani elites painfully aware that their "long nourished American equalizer" would not be available in time of crisis.³¹ The greater challenges to the US neutrality occurred during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 because the Soviet-India partnership and treaty of 1971 successfully neutralized the US and China. But the US strategy in South Asia changed the regional scenario and upset the 'balance of power' and left India "unchecked" to impose its will upon the other countries of the region.³² This was a time when Pakistan helped the Nixon administration's moves to improve relations with China, including the secret arrangements for Henry Kissinger's visit to Beijing via Pakistan in 1971. The US and China gave verbal support to Pakistan but both were helpless to defend Pakistan's territorial integrity. State Department and American public opinion were unfavourable to Pakistan and its army's action in the eastern wing.³³ In addition, the US showed their tilt to Pakistan but it was simply to avoid war in the region; they accepted the inevitability of

Bangladesh, but only to save West Pakistan's anticipated disintegration.³⁴ The US conveyed to the Soviets that if they were not going to restrain India, the US might have to undertake tougher action.³⁵

It was clear that, practically, the US was not involved in South Asia until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In general, the United States accepted India as a regional power to assure peace and security in the region. In 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger acknowledged that "the size and position of India give it a special role of leadership in South Asia and world affairs."³⁶ It was hoped that, ultimately, Pakistan and Afghanistan would also come under this collaboration. However, the Indian nuclear explosion in May 1974 and Pakistan's intention to go nuclear forced the US administration to take interest in the region to prevent nuclear proliferation. The Carter administration took a strong stand against Pakistan's nuclear development, cutting off economic and military assistance.³⁷ However, the advent of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet adventurism in Afghanistan fuelled the long-standing Western fear of Soviet expansionism and gave an acute sense of urgency to the need to retaliate and stop the advancement of the communists. US regional and global interests compelled it to reestablish relations with Pakistan, which had become a "front-line state" and the importance of Pakistan can easily be understood from the Secretary of Defence's statement in March 1980:

Pakistan has become, through a combination of circumstances and geography, a vital strategic area in the present contest between the expansionist and non-expansionist power centers. Pakistan strategic location can be a bridge between Southwest and Southeast Asia which is physical barrier to the southward expansion of the Soviet Union and it will be adequate counterweight to an expansionist Soviet.³⁸

South Asia has always remained an area of peripheral and derivative interest to the United States. The latter depends little on the resources of the region which is not crucial to its economy. Neither American investment nor the volume of trade with the region is substantial enough to make the area an important partner. The US interest has always been to prevent communism, rather than to take advantage of the South Asian market. Thus, the primary objective of this section is to analyse the different US interests in South Asia, and its preparedness to undertake a serious political, economic and military action, irrespective of the cost involved. Thus, the dimension of the superpower interests in South Asia can be defined in different categories such as political, economic and strategic, to achieve specific goals calculated to serve vital interests.

The United States policy in South Asia was strictly bound by the time factor, together with economic and political changes in the subcontinent. The overriding US concern was to ensure that no hostile power, specifically the Soviet Union, gained a position of dominance in South Asia. Thus, in the region of South Asia the US policy had always been governed by the need to contain communism. The US virtually assumed responsibility for security management in the region because South Asia is a back door of the Persian Gulf and it acts as a shield to protect the core interests of industrialised nations. The US interests in South Asia at their most fundamental level have been to preserve peace and thwart any threat to their vital interests.³⁹ In addition, South Asia's importance to the United States must be seen in a broader perspective because this is a region where international politics always dominate, due to its strategic link with Persian Gulf oil, and its fate can increasingly influence world politics.⁴⁰ However, the US felt a "moral commitment" to save the free world from the flood of communism and engaged itself in a relentless struggle for global domination, especially in the peripheral areas of the world. Moreover, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

had given new life to the threat to choke off oil supplies to the industrial nations and the US was concerned to maintain regional stability and preserve economic and commercial interests.

Economic Interests

The economic importance of South Asia is linked with the concentration of many of the raw material resources of the world, such as oil, rubber, manganese, copper, tea, cotton, rice, jute and gold in the various littoral states.⁴¹ This raw material is a real backbone for industrialized nations, including Europe and Japan and threats to the sources of important raw material and supply lines could affect the economy of the free world. Thus, the US is committed to preserve peace and assure access to raw materials and markets and to gain economic and commercial benefits from South Asian economies.

Stalin highlighted the economic vulnerability of the west to resource interdiction back in 1921 when he argued: “If Europe and America may be called the front, the non-sovereign nations and colonies, with their raw materials, fuel, food and vast stores of human material, should be regarded as the rear, the reserve of imperialism. In order to win a war one must not only triumph at the front but also revolutionize the enemy’s rear, his reserves.”⁴² In the same way, the Soviet president Leonid I. Brezhnev explained to Somalian President Said Barre, that “our aim is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the West depends—the energy treasure of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of Central and Southern Africa.”⁴³ Thus, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan was a formidable threat to Europe in the west, China and Japan in the east and the countries of Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East and Africa to the south. More broadly speaking, the bountiful oil resources of the Gulf region are essential to the West and will remain indispensable until economically viable alternative sources of energy

become available.⁴⁴ The United States is less than five percent dependent on imported oil and strategic minerals but over half of the oil consumed in the western industrialized economies. Europe, Australia and Japan are absolutely dependent on overseas sources. The industrialised nations remain dependent on Gulf oil and during 1989-90 it accounted for 35 percent of France's oil, 32 percent of Italy's, 35 percent of Germany's and 95 percent of Japan's.⁴⁵

Minor interruptions of imports could be cause of inconvenience and annoyance in the United States might create panic to its industrial allies. Thus, the Western anxiety was quite logical and concerned about the Soviet drive toward the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean on which the West depends. In the same vein, the US had a vital stake because they are also dependent on oil and strategic materials. Nixon was one of the scholars who really understood the Soviets and he argued that "the Soviet leaders have their eyes on the economic underpinnings of modern society. Their aim is to pull the plug on the Western industrial machine. The Western industrial nations dependence on foreign sources of vital raw materials is one of our main vulnerabilities."⁴⁶ In the circumstances, the US recognized that ensuring Persian Gulf security and stability is a vital US interest. The successive US administrations formulated a long term strategic policy with regard to the region's oil resources and highlighted the critical importance of petroleum and its by-products as the 'foundation of the ability to fight a modern war.'⁴⁷ For this purpose, the post-war era has been marked by two major US interests in the Persian Gulf region: containment of Soviet influence and the preservation of the conservative local regimes through network of treaties with the various sheikhs and rulers and its elaborate regional military presence.⁴⁸

Strategic Interests

Strategically, South Asia is at the crossroads of the great powers' interests. The principal US strategic interests in the region were and are maintenance of

the freedom of the seas and the protection of European interests in the strategic parts of the world, i.e. the freedom to keep the high seas open for navigation, not only for itself but also for allies. As early as 1948, Harry Hodson had described the Gulf region as a borderland where great interests meet and clash. The area stretched in a rough, dangerous arc from Kashmir to the Northwest Frontier province of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Egypt. This curve embraced the Gulf region “as closely and as neatly as the Turkish crescent embraces the star.” For Hodson, this was the Arc of Danger.⁴⁹ C. L. Sulzberger have written in the *New York Times* that South Asia has immense strategic and geographical value and Pakistan is a “geographical absurdity” because it can block potential Soviet expansion southward through Afghanistan.⁵⁰ Another strategic reason for American interest in the region and Pakistan was the proximity of northern West Pakistan and “Azad Kashmir” to the Soviet Central Asia and of former East Pakistan to Tibet and the Sino-Burmese frontier. Thus, it was easy for American airplanes based in Peshawar and the Gilgit region could carry out crippling attacks on the industrial power concentrated in Soviet Central Asia. Moreover, United States regarded the area of South Asia as vital for its global interest and in any circumstances the US had the capability to go anywhere and meet any potential challenge to friend or ally.

In the 1950s the United States perceived that communism is the major threat to itself and was therefore eager to see other nations (India and Pakistan) must join the US in organizing the defense of the free world against communism. In this regard, Pakistan was willing to go along with the American policy of military alliances in Asia for the purpose of containing communism but equally desired to obtain American support in its dispute with India.⁵¹ However, no particular development took place between the US-Pakistan relations until the inauguration of the Republican administration in 1953 and John Foster Dulles (Secretary of State) was impressed by the “northern tier”

scheme for the containment of Soviet Union. The scheme was in line with Dulles plans for regional alliances for the containment and encirclement of the communist land-mass. He visited Pakistan in May 1953 and returned to the United States with impressive vision about Pakistan and declared on 1 June 1953 that “Pakistan occupies a high position in the Muslim world. The strong spiritual faith of the people makes them a dependable bulwark against communism.”⁵² However, Pakistan received military assistance vis-à-vis India but the American reason for the grant of military aid to Pakistan was the building up of Pakistan’s military strength so that it could cope with any communist military threat to its security as well as contribute to the defence of the region (South Asia and Middle East) in case of communist threat.⁵³ On the other hand, the Indian importance for the United States was determined by American global strategy and the US confrontation with China in Southeast Asia. However, as long as India did not assume a paramount position in the global strategy of the US the policy makers of Pakistan hoped that it might be possible to increase American responsiveness to its demands by convincing the US about Pakistan’s importance as an ally. But as India began to gain more and more importance in the global strategy of the US and especially in American policies relating to the containment of China in Southeast Asia, Pakistan’s chances of convincing the US to increase its responsiveness to Pakistan’s demands relating to its security declined.⁵⁴ Moreover, India’s importance in American global policy reached its climax when Sino-India war of 1962 started and the US did not hesitate to supply military aid to India but this action was interpreted by Pakistan as affecting adversely Pakistan’s fundamental objective of security vis-à-vis India.⁵⁵ The US also refused to put any pressure on India during the Sino-Indian border war to come to a settlement on the Kashmir question with Pakistan. Thus, the events of the 1960s convinced the Pakistanis that as far as their objectives of security were concerned, an alliance with the US was worth little.⁵⁶

Before the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Soviet base Mary in Turkmenistan (earlier known as Merv) was nearer to the Straits of Hormuz. When the Russians first moved into the Mary oasis in 1884, Britain warned the Russians over their intentions. The Russian ambassador in London argued that it was difficult “for a civilized power to stop in the extension of its territory where uncivilized tribes were its immediate neighbours.”⁵⁷ Later, Russians halted at the area along the Amu Darya (River) in the nineteenth century and that river formed the border with Afghanistan until Russian troops crashed across it in late 1979. There are no natural barriers separating Afghanistan from the Arabian Sea and the Straits of Hormuz because there is only barren land. But Pakistan’s port Gawader (Baluchistan) has 750 miles of strategic shoreline along the Arabian Sea, reaching almost to the Straits of Hormuz. The Soviet desired to captured this area and if the Soviets succeeded in taking effective control of the Persian Gulf then Europe and Japan would be at the mercy of the Soviet Union. Moreover, from Turkey to Pakistan, the countries of the “northern tier” that once held the Soviets in check were either in turmoil or gravely weakened. As Robert Thompson has noted, “the Soviet has three fronts: a Western Europe front, an eastern front facing China and Japan and a southern front facing the countries between Turkey and Afghanistan. The third front has been breached after the invasion in Afghanistan and the Soviet is moving southward toward to the Persian Gulf, the centre of the aspirations of the Soviet Union.”⁵⁸ Harold Brown, the Secretary of Defence, highlighted the dependence of the West and the industrialized nations on the oil reserves in the region. The Soviet threat was more ominous because, while the Western world was left extremely vulnerable due to its need for oil, the Soviet Union enjoyed relative self-sufficiency.⁵⁹ According to one assessment, “if every oil field in the Middle East were to cease production, the Soviet Union would be almost totally unaffected, while the West would face economic and social disruption of catastrophic proportions.”⁶⁰ In fact, both the military and the economic power

of the world depend on oil. This basic fact made the Persian Gulf the eye of the global storm in the closing days of the twentieth century. Thus, if the Soviet Union had gained the power to turn off the oil spigots of the Middle East then it could easily have blackmailed most of the industrialised nations. The truth is that energy is the lifeblood of the economic system and economic power is the foundation of military power.

Soviet Interests in South Asia

The Soviet Union was a Eurasian empire since its formation and before continuous with czarist Russia. In the recent past, Soviet concern with Asia dates, however, only from the post World War II, when the communist leadership adopted a “forward” strategy in Asia and this region became an arena for Moscow’s global competition with the United States and, later, for regional competition with China. Moreover, the patterns of Soviet involvement in South Asia began to evolve long before the break-up of the British colonial empire in the subcontinent. Through the international communist movement, the Soviet had relations with communists in several of the countries of the region. These parties often accepted Moscow’s lead, especially on issues of foreign affairs but also about the domestic strategy to counter the bourgeois capitalists.

Historically, the Soviet Union was most concerned with its borderland states and with the southern periphery. Especially in the post World War II period, Moscow projected concern as well as power. The expansion of the czarist empire in the direction of the Turkish Straits and the warm waters of the Indian Ocean could hardly be described as defensive policy.⁶¹ The decline and subsequent demise of the Ottoman empire was an invitation to enhance, not threaten czarist security. The relentless pursuit and subjugation of fragmented Muslim tribes in Central Asia was also part of a larger scramble for power engaged in by the more successful empires of the period. The Soviets were

determined to hold the British in India, as much as the British empire was determined to prevent the czar's forces from further advantaging themselves at the expense of a weak Iran and an even weaker Afghanistan.⁶² Moreover, the Soviet leadership repudiated czarist conquest in the region of Central Asia, Asia Minor and the Indian Ocean and virtually all its expansionist policies of tsardom and "Great Game" (Central Asia and Afghanistan) were part of the Soviet ambition and advancement in the region. The Soviet leaders vehemently supported the emancipation of South Asia from the clutches of British imperialism and Lenin's remarks (1916) about the impending emancipation movements in the European colonies were thought provoking:

We shall exert every effort to foster association and merger with Mongolians, Indians, (subcontinent people) Egyptians. We believe it is our duty in our interest to do this—we shall endeavour to render to these nations, more backward and oppressed than we are, "disinterested cultural assistance." We will help them pass to use of machinery, to the lightening of labour to democracy, to socialism.⁶³

The Russian revolution of 1917 had also a great impact on the emancipation movements in South Asia. Lenin once said, "the road to Paris passes through South Asia and this region is a source of European exploitation especially and Pacific Asia and Africa in general."⁶⁴ Lenin's views about European imperialism were indicated when a number of Asian and African countries received emancipation from various European colonial powers. In October 1917, the League of the Liberation of the East, based in Moscow, had suggested for India an important route to Asia. The Soviet influence in India was considered imperative for a wider Russian role in Asia. However, the Soviet Union reestablished its interest in India when the Communist Party of India (CPI) was founded by Satya Bhakta. Moreover, the Indian Nationalist leaders, especially

Jawaharlal Nehru, were impressed with the success of the Russian revolution and stressed close ties between Moscow and the Indian political movements in order to demoralize the British influence in India. As Jawaharlal Nehru remarked in 1929: “Russia cannot be ignored by us, because they are our neighbour, a powerful neighbour, who may be friendly to us and cooperate with us, or may be a thorn in our side.”⁶⁵

Thus, the geo-strategic prominence of South Asia was well recognised in the eyes of the Soviet Policy makers because it was in the backyard of the Soviet Central Asian and southern borders. It therefore, obtained high priority in terms of security and politics. Soviet policies in South Asia were determined on the basis of global power politics. Its interest in South Asia was linked with its traditional czarist urge to gain access to the warm water ports, for global domination. Historically, the Soviets have always ranked the Indian subcontinent below Europe and East Asia in terms of its interests and concerns. The West has been the principal source of the Soviet Union’s culture under the czars as well as their communist successors.⁶⁶ During the 19th century, Russia and the other great power in the area, Britain, played a great power chess game with Afghanistan as the board which separated their spheres of influence. Russian interest in Afghanistan in the first half of the 19th century was concerned primarily with security and economic, as a result of British activities in the region. Count Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign Minister, illustrated the economic and security elements in an 1838 dispatch to the Russian Ambassador in Britain and the message referred in part to:

indefatigable activity displayed by English travelers in spreading disquiet among the people of Central Asia, and in carrying agitation even into the heart of countries bordering on our frontiers; while on our part we ask nothing but to be

admitted to share in fair competition the commercial advantages of Asia.⁶⁷

Thus, the southward expansion of Russia, toward South Asia and its warm water port has been Russia's cherished foreign policy goal. Commercial and security interests provided the justification and logic for expansion. As Prince Gorchakov, the Russian Chancellor, noted in 1864:

The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized states which come into contact with half savage, wandering tribes possessing no fixed social organisation. It invariably happens in such cases that the interests of security on the frontier, and of commercial relations, compel the more civilized states to exercise a certain ascendancy over neighbours whose turbulence and monad instincts render them difficult to live with.....The United States, France in Algeria, Holland in her colonies, England in India-all have been inevitably drawn to a course wherein ambition plays a smaller part than imperious necessity and where the greatest difficulty is knowing where to stop.⁶⁸

The difficulty of "knowing where to stop" led to a second Anglo-Afghan war in 1878. Later, in 1885, as the British Government and Russia were negotiating the Russian-Afghan border demarcation, the Russian army seized the Afghan-held Panjdeh Oasis near Herat. In this regard, the Russian newspaper "*Novosti*" proclaimed that the Russian objective was not just Herat itself, which was only a window looking southeastward, but a Russian empire bordering the Indian Ocean, in fulfillment of Russia's historic destiny.⁶⁹ Further, the Russian imperial expansionism was influenced to some degree by the inability of the czars to control far off military commanders and

governors-general. They nevertheless readily accepted that new lands where the Russian flag was planted, due in some part, no doubt, to this vision of a greater Russian empire bordering the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The renowned Russian writer, Dostoevsky, pointed out that:

the Russian “historic” destiny and Russia’s main outlet from years of isolation lay, not in Europe, but in Asia-because in Europe, the Russians were hangers-on and slaves; in Asia, Russians could be masters.⁷⁰

In the 1940s the Soviet leadership was preoccupied with internal transformation and trauma and threats from stronger adversaries in Europe and the Far East; but when the external environment turned favourable, Moscow once again made known its imperial desires. Thus, on 25 November 1940, Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov, responding to Hitler’s offer of a division of the Eurasian land mass, indicated that Moscow was interested in such an arrangement, “provided that within the next few months the security of the Soviet Union in the straits is assured by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, which geographically is situated within the security zone of the Black sea boundaries of the Soviet Union, and by the establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the USSR within range of Bosphorus and the Dardenelles by means of a long-term lease.....[and] provided that the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognised as the centre of the aspirations of the Soviet Union.”⁷¹ Moreover, the Soviet also has a record of historical interest and cultural links with South Asia, particularly with regard to the strategic choke points of Indian Ocean and to warm water ports. They had been an essential ingredient of its foreign policy, which was aptly articulated by a Admiral Sergei Gorehkov of the Soviet fleet in 1945, who stated that “the goal of the Soviet sea power is to effectively utilize the world Oceans in the interests of building communism.”⁷²

South Asia occupied an intermediate position in the hierarchy of the Soviet foreign policy. No South Asian nation possessed the indigenous power to threaten the Soviet Union and the ability of certain countries to ally themselves with a major power hostile to Moscow periodically created apprehension among Soviet leaders. Initially, Soviet leaders concentrated attention on Europe because they saw Europe as having anti-capitalist revolutionary potential and later they perceived the United States as the most serious threats to Russian security.⁷³ The rising powers of Japan and China were also great concern to the Soviet policy makers. The Soviet leaders were aware that they could not achieve their cherished ambition of being recognized as a global power without a strong position in the region along their southern border from the eastern Mediterranean through the Indian subcontinent. It was therefore natural for the Soviet Union to compete with the United States and preserve the Asian status quo and it was committed to maintain its predominant interest in Asia, particularly in South Asia.

The Soviet Union was generally perceived as the dominant external power in South Asia. Its influence and presence in the region had proved to be more effective and durable than those of its two rivals, the United States and China. Armed conflict between the forces of national liberation and those of imperialism had paved the way for Soviet penetration of the South, Southwest and East Asia. Thus, in fact, the Soviet became involved in South Asian affairs in the late 1950s as an outcome of its anti-capitalist approach and reactionary intrigues directed against the suppressed people of the subcontinent. Initially, Moscow's most important purpose was to ensure that the subcontinent would not be utilized by any power against any country. Its principal means was to be India's security guarantor and even to stand ready to be the neutral mediator of intra-regional disputes. However, the situation changed radically when the United States introduced their doctrine of

containment as pursued through the defence pacts in the late 1950s. These developments attempted to match the substance of Soviet-Indian relations against the Western strategic partnership. India naturally preferred the Soviet Union to counter the moves and it was bound to touch their respective vital national interests, sometimes straining and at other times reinforcing their bilateral relations, without predetermination.⁷⁴ However, India and the Soviet Union both came together to seek diminution of Western dominance and limitation on the American military presence in Asia and to counter the ideological and military threat of China in different ways. The Soviet and India both bitterly opposed military alliances (SEATO-CENTO) because Pakistan joined and Nehru's belief that military alliances restricted the sovereignty of newly independent countries, and would bring India-Pakistan into the region of the Cold War.⁷⁵ India also felt Pakistan's aim was to put pressure on her because of the Kashmir conflict and to encircle her with a ring of hostile alliances.

The Soviet Union also criticized the Western military pacts and Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin came to India in 1955 and proclaimed their political and diplomatic support for India in its dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir.⁷⁶ A similar offer was made to Afghanistan in its Pakhtunistan dispute with Pakistan, which amounted to intervention in local conflicts. On 10 December 1955 Bulganin declared in Kabul:

We sympathize with Afghanistan's policy on the question of Pakhtunistan. The Soviet Union stands for an equitable solution to this problem, which cannot be settled correctly without taking into account the vital interests of the people inhabiting Pakhtunistan.⁷⁷

Premier Khrushchev paid his second visit to Afghanistan in March 1960. During this visit, he hailed the relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan as an “excellent example of peaceful coexistence and friendly relations between countries with different political and social systems.” He discussed the Pakhtunistan issue with the Afghan government and declared: “Historically as you know, Pakhtunistan has always been part of Afghanistan.”⁷⁸ *Pravda*, the Communist Party newspaper, also repeated Khrushchev’s stand on the Pakhtunistan issue. The Soviet pro-Afghan pronouncements on the Pakhtunistan issue turned into a dramatic display of Soviet support for Kabul during the third and most serious eruption of the Pakhtunistan issue in the 1960s. On 25 March 1961 a *Pravda* article by O. Skalkin, expressed full support to Afghan government and called Pakistan’s proposal for a plebiscite on the Pakhtunistan issue a “provocational Plan” which had originated in the CENTO military alliance. The article claimed that the disputed area, from which the U-2 flight had also started (Peshawar) lay so near Soviet territory that the Soviet Union could not remain indifferent to this dangerous dispute.⁷⁹ The Soviet government newspaper, *Izvestia* warned Pakistan that “it would be a serious mistake on Pakistan’s part to hope that the Soviet Union will remain indifferent to a military conflict”⁸⁰ in South Asia. This was a time when Moscow could afford to conduct its Asian policy without total reliance on European events and the Soviet Union played a balance of power game against the United States. The Soviet’s primary purpose was to use South Asia as a jumping-off place for more direct access to Southeast Asia and Persian Gulf area and as a staging area for outflanking China.

Soviet Objectives in South Asia

The Soviet leadership showed their will in South Asia to limit the US and China influence in the region. India cooperated with the Soviet Union and they moved from non-alignment to a kind of bi-alignment with the Soviets to

counter Chinese influence. Both conducted long friendship and become an important symbol in world politics. Moscow perceived the US and China as potential threats to Soviet interests in South Asia and the Indian Ocean area. To a certain extent the Soviet considered that the competition for influence in the area was a zero-sum game: to the extent that to reduce the Chinese and the US influence, Soviet influence must be expanded. For this purpose, the Soviet Union urged India to take diplomatic and economic decisions to assist in this process of lessening the US influence in South and Southwest Asia.

The Soviet encouraged India, as a leader of the Third World, to take an international position as close as possible to that of the Soviet Union. For this purpose the Soviets sought to promote the image of a Soviet-Indian identity of views, for its impact on the US, China and the Third World. The main purpose of Soviet policy was that India would be the shield for the Soviet to maintain influence and friendship between the Third World nations and the Soviet Union. Moscow also supported India's political, social and economic development in the direction of a "socialist economy" and a "progressive" polity. The third major Soviet reason for minimizing Chinese influence in Pakistan was because the Sino-Pakistan partnership was the direct result of Sino-Indian conflict. China emerged as a reliable partner of Pakistan, who seemed willing to give material and political support in the event of war with India. As the Foreign Minister, Z. A. Bhutto, stated in July 1963, "an Indian attack on Pakistan would also involve the security and territorial integrity of the largest state in Asia."⁸¹ For China, Pakistan could provide the breach in an arc of hostile powers surrounding China; an ally that could prevent the consolidation of Soviet power in an area of vulnerability.

The Soviet Union perceived that the hold over South Asia, the Persian Gulf and Northern Tier (Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey) was vital for its strategic and vital interest. For this purpose, it looked on India as a reliable friend. The

Soviet leadership was even hopeful that the close relationship with India would help to reduce western influence in the region.⁸² Moscow's relationship with New Delhi had been built primarily on a mutual sense of need—a shared perception in each state that the friendship of the other was essential to the preservation of its own security.⁸³ The Soviets had sought to build strong and lasting commercial ties with India—both as a way of weakening the fabric of “imperialist” economies and as a useful partner for their own economy—and, through propaganda and cultural exchange, to create attitudes among the Indian elite and masses that were favourable to the Soviet. However, India desired more balance in its relations with the “great power triangle” than the Soviets would have liked, however, and the Soviets sought to maintain more balance in their own relations in the subcontinent than India desired or needed. However, the Soviet adopted a moderate policy toward Pakistan; its support for the Indian position on Kashmir disappeared from Indo-Soviet communiqués and Moscow proclaimed its neutrality in the disputes between India and Pakistan. The Soviet also took a similar position during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and *Pravda* asserted, “We would like Soviet-Pakistan relations, like our traditional friendship with India, to be a stabilising factor in the situation in Asia and to contribute to the normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan.”⁸⁴

During the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, Premier Kosygin volunteered to provide the “good offices” of the Soviet Union in helping to settle the conflict between Pakistan and India. It was a clear indication of the Soviet's interest and stature in the region. The Soviet was the only superpower capable of intervening in the conflict and bringing about a peaceful settlement which would have been all but impossible if left to the devices of the Indians and Pakistanis themselves.⁸⁵ Moscow also used its efforts in the United Nations to promote a cease-fire and in January 1966 both countries accepted Soviet mediation and at the invitation of Premier Alexei Kosygin, India and Pakistan

were brought together in Tashkent, the capital of the Republic of Uzbekistan, to negotiate a settlement and end of hostilities.⁸⁶ Moscow intervened between India and Pakistan on the theory of geographical propinquity. The Soviet also told the leaders of India and Pakistan that “we are taking interest between both of the countries because your area is close to the borders of the Soviet state.”⁸⁷ Thus, Tashkent was a personal triumph for Kosygin; the “spirit of Tashkent” temporarily served to warm Soviet-Pakistan relations; and it signaled the Soviet Union as a major player in South Asia. Thus, in 1960s the Soviet focused on India, Afghanistan and Pakistan and sought to assist these countries in pursuing a non-capitalist path of development. Afghanistan and India were among the top priorities of the Soviet Union and they received considerable attention from Soviet policy makers and financial assistance for development. In 1969 Pakistan agreed to close down the extensive US intelligence facilities⁸⁸ in Peshawar (Badabar) which was the main source of confrontation with the Soviet Union.

In fact, in the late 1950s the US was at work on a secret programme to photograph the strategic parts, both from balloons and from the U-2 aircraft.⁸⁹ The U-2 was test-flown from an American base in Peshawar [Badabar] on 6 August 1955 and made its first over flight of the Soviet Union in July 1956. The proposal to allow mutual aerial inspection was rejected by Nikita Khrushchev on 21 July 1955. Subsequently, the US decided to engage unilaterally in aerial inspection of the USSR with the U-2. On 1 May 1960 the U-2 was shot down over the Soviet Union, after it took off for a 3788-mile spy flight from Peshawar. The U2 facilities were deployed near Peshawar [Badabar], with permission of Prime Minister of Hussain Shaheed Suharwardy but in 1958 final arrangements were made with General Ayub Khan for flying the U-2 from Lahore and Peshawar. In 1959 Ayub Khan signed a ten year lease for an American intelligence base at Peshawar the mission of U-2 was basically three year project to search out Soviet nuclear and missile

installations. The Soviet leaders were annoyed and Soviet Premier Khrushchev abused Pakistan during the address to the Supreme Soviet on May 7, 1960 and stated: “We warn those countries that make their territory available for launching planes with anti-Soviet intentions: however, if these governments did not know---and I allow in this case they were not informed---they should have known what the American military was doing on their territory against the Soviet Union.”⁹⁰ On another occasion in a reception at Czechoslovakia’s embassy on 9 May 1960, in Moscow, Khrushchev called Ambassador Salman Ali of Pakistan, and bluntly told him: “Peshawar has been marked on our map. In the future, if any American plan is allowed to use Peshawar as base operations against the Soviet Union, we will retaliate immediately—and have to aim our rockets at your bases as well.”⁹¹

In June 1969, President Brezhnev introduced an Asian Collective Security System⁹² and its context was one of strong Soviet hostility to China. The Soviet, in floating the idea, mentioned a number of possible members—Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, India, Pakistan and Singapore, which may have been a random selection. It was interesting that Afghanistan had no territorial link with China but shared with India a common antagonism to Pakistan. However, most Asian governments appear to have reacted coolly or at least did not warmly welcome the idea of ‘collective security’. Pakistan rejected Brezhnev’s call for ‘collective security system’ and it also turned down Kosygin’s (1969) proposal for regional economic cooperation by India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.⁹³ Pakistan made it clear that development of economic cooperation with India was contingent on the resolution of outstanding political issues, including Kashmir.⁹⁴

During 1969-71 Pakistan was in serious political turmoil because the people of the eastern wing were demanding autonomy and Pakistan’s elites considered that the demand of rights from the eastern wing was a challenge to the

country's solidarity.⁹⁵ The inability to manage the political situation led to the outbreak of civil war in March 1971. At that time the Soviet Union was the only major power to intervene openly in the internal affairs of Pakistan. On 3 April 1971, Nikolai Podgorny sent a message to President Yahya Khan in which he expressed concern at the suffering and privations of the people of Bangladesh and urged an immediate stoppage of the bloodshed and a "peaceful political settlement with the elected leaders of the people."⁹⁶ Yahya Khan ignored the Kremlin's warning and was hopeful of receiving US help in setting up a civilian regime in East Pakistan, under Awami League leadership. Soviet leaders also felt disturbance when Pakistan arranged facilitated a secret trip by Henry Kissinger, to Beijing in July 1971. Ultimately, this dramatic shift raised serious doubts in New Delhi and Moscow about the specter of a Sino-US and Pakistani alignment.

Kissinger's visit to China changed the strategic situation of the region. India and the Soviet Union also thought that an emerging alliance between the US and China would be directly against the Soviet Union and India. This situation persuaded Brezhnev to make a special relationship with India and both countries signed on 9 August 1971 a 20 years Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation⁹⁷. According to T. N. Kaul, "it was one of the few closely guarded secret negotiations that India has ever conducted. On one side, hardly half a dozen people were aware of it, including the prime minister and the foreign minister. The media got no scent of it."⁹⁸ The significance of the treaty cannot be over-estimated. The Soviet Union was guaranteed to meet the security needs of India in the event of aggression or threat of aggression. Both countries issued a joint communiqué calling for the withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam. Under the treaty, India was able to rely on Soviet diplomatic support and arms supplies in the war against Pakistan which was already in the offing.⁹⁹ The Soviet military forces massed on China's northern border served as a clear warning to Beijing not to render more than verbal assistance to

Pakistan. The war played the role of midwife at the birth of Bangladesh. It also played an essential role in India's victory over Pakistan, which was no longer able to mount a credible challenge to India. While the Soviets-Americans and Chinese rivals in the first test of the new "anti-Soviet axis," had both lined up on the side of the clear loser, the Soviet Union stood firmly with India and it emerged unchallenged as the top ranking external power in South Asia. A Soviet diplomat at the United Nations exulted: "This is the first time in history that the United States and China have been defeated together."¹⁰⁰

Moreover, in the late 1970s the Soviet objectives in South Asia were relatively based on Indo-Soviet collaboration to counter the Sino-US and Pakistan alignment and to minimize Chinese influence in the region. In this respect, Howard Wriggins characterized the US policy towards South Asia from 1965 to 1979 as one of "minimum concern....perhaps encapsulated in the proposition' they can do little good, but also little harm."¹⁰¹ Thus, with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 the US was forced to recognize the region's strategic importance and establish relations with Pakistan in order to contain communism. China also cooperated with the United States to counter Soviet adventurism. Moreover, the period of 1970-79 proved to be unsuccessful for the Soviet diplomacy in terms of geopolitical perspective. Events in the countries of South Asia were demonstrating to the Soviet Union that backsliding was always a danger for the young fragile regimes. Thus, the Soviet Union's dream of countering the US and Chinese influence in the region collapsed with its own demise and disintegration.

Sino-Soviet Confrontation

In the late 1960s, the Soviet and Chinese foreign policy interests came into conflict and their world views began to diverge rapidly. China developed a more radical policy against the imperialist West and the United States.

Whereas, the Soviet Union remained wedded to a policy of peaceful co-existence and in a search for détente with the United States. Chinese had argued that increased Soviet leverage should be put at the service of the socialist bloc and had seemed to test Soviet credibility to use its power on behalf of its major ideological ally during crises in 1958 over the Chinese offshore islands and over the Sino-Indian war in 1962. In each case China had found the Soviets to be more close to the US and against the fundamental principles of communist revolutionary aspirations.

The Soviet Union provided economic, technical and military assistance to India on attractive terms and sent their experts to build huge industrial infrastructure. Moscow sought to take advantage of the regional security problems by providing massive military assistance to India, just to counter China. Thus, Moscow's most important purpose in South Asia, pursued ardently and likely to persist for the foreseeable future, was the enlistment of India's participation as a counterweight to China in the Asian "balance of power" game.¹⁰² In the late 1960s the Soviet Union had perceived politically and militarily China as the major threat to its security and as a primary obstacle to the spread of their influence in Asia. Thus, the Soviet's friendly posture toward India had needed to be balanced by the maintenance and even strengthening of its ties with Pakistan and the other countries of the region. In 1968, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia was described by the Chinese as not simply "revisionist" but "social imperialist."¹⁰³

Soviet Interest in Persian Gulf

The Middle East and the Persian Gulf region had a unique importance in the Soviet global politics due to its intrinsic importance-oil.¹⁰⁴ The sea lanes of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean were always important to the Soviet Union. Its leaders concluded that "the country which can influence this region in the future...and control the centre of the world will be the dominant force

throughout the world.”¹⁰⁵ Since Peter the Great, the Soviet Union had engaged themselves in a relentless struggle for global domination, especially in the peripheral areas of the world. Their clash of interests was more pronounced in strategically significant areas such as the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. In this context, the Soviet maintained its *de facto* suzerainty over the friendly states of Middle East in terms of economic and military assistance and by a policy of provoking intra-regional disputes.

Historically, in the nineteenth-century, the European powers and czarist Russia were active in the Persian Gulf region but Russia, with some justification, could consider it a local power. In the 1800s Russia’s southward expansion brought the czarist empire not only to the Iranian border, but also to the point of direct involvement in Persians Gulf.¹⁰⁶ By the turn of the century, the region had become a pawn in the Anglo-Russian chess game then being played out in Asia. The two rivals for regional power signed a convention in 1907 that divided the country into British and czarist spheres of influence and in 1908 Russian troops crossed the border. Although the founder of the Bolshevik revolution, Vladimir I. Lenin, renounced all czarist treaties, the desire to control the warm water ports of Asia never left the minds of Soviet leaders.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, the Soviets conducted their activities in the region through political, ideological, economic and military means. This dimension was linked to Soviet energy and trade concerns with the various countries of the region. Moscow also moved to establish stable, long-term economic relationships with major oil exporting countries in order to secure supply

In the late 1950s the Soviet played the radical card and established their relations with the ‘nationalist’ and ‘anti-imperialist’ elements in the Arab world, at the helm of which stood Gamal Abdal Nasser’s Egypt. It was in their intense hostility to the Baghdad Pact (CENTO) signed in 1955 and designed as a crucial link in the West’s effort to contain the alleged spread of

'international Communism', that the interests of the Soviet Union and the Arab nationalist forces converged. Moscow perceived the Western military alliance as a major threat to Soviet security, and the Arab nationalists saw it as a further proof of the old colonial powers' determination to keep the Arab states under their tutelage.¹⁰⁸ The Soviet leaders public ally condemned the defence pacts and promised to support radical countries of the Middle East (Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Palestinian guerrilla groups and Egypt) to strengthen the national independence and consolidating peace and friendly cooperation among the people.¹⁰⁹ Moscow provided military and logistical assistance to their allies to reduce the US influence from the area and thereby Soviet increase its strategic, and ultimately political and ideological interests.

In addition, the Soviet interests in the Middle East were not only for oil but its abundant presence in the region was to control the spigot. The Soviet had enormous petroleum deposits in Siberia, and some experts had expressed confidence in Moscow's determination to utilize these resources to help maintain "energy independence" at almost any cost. The Soviet desired Persian Gulf oil for its allies in the East European countries and also for its own domestic needs. It also had gas reserves which, at about 35 percent, were the largest in the world, even larger than the Middle East's 29 percent.¹¹⁰ But the problem with gas supply, however, was that it was much more costly than the Middle East oil. Thus, the Soviet needed more oil to run its economy and meet domestic requirements and push the Soviet leaders to become the dominant power in the Gulf region in order to control the primary source of the region.¹¹¹ The Soviet made no secret of its readiness to help the littoral countries dislodge the Western powers from their "strangle-hold" of the basin's wealth. The Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean is one of the strongest resources of raw materials, from whose rapacious exploitation American and other Western monopolies derive fabulous profits. The Soviet saw South and Southwest Asia as their 'backyard' and extremely sensitive for their vital

interests. During the Cold War era, it was the Kremlin's predominant policy to reduce Western influence in the Gulf, in particular the US military presence. The Soviets also considered the US naval forces in the Indian Ocean (Diego Garcia) to be dangerous and wished to change the Gulf rulers' tacit acceptance of its presence. Moscow's offensive considerations and access to Gulf oil were mainly to weaken the economies of the industrialized nations and to create uncertainty in the region to obtain some leverage or to gain concessionary rates for Persian Gulf oil for its communist allies.

Conclusion

Since 1945 the region of South Asia had no valuable importance for the United States but in the absence of the US the Soviet Union had taken full advantage to expand its influence in the region. For the US region was neither crucial to its economy nor vital for investment and trade relations. It always had shown their interest in the region from global pursuits disregarding the aspiration of regional actors. Thus, the US never introduced long-terms and well-calculated policy for the region but it was more interested to prevent the flood of communism and determined to contain the Soviet expansionism in the Persian Gulf region. According to Perviaz Iqbal Cheema, the US always misunderstood the "conflictual cobweb of South Asia" and pressurized Pakistan (the most loyal ally in Asia) not to annoy India. In fact, they failed to accommodate Pakistan's wishes at the expense of India who always hurt the United States interests in the region. Although the US major concern has been and still is to strengthen India against China but policy makers have not been successful to achieve their objectives from India. Thus, during the Cold War the US efforts for the stability and peace in South Asia were less impressive but the Soviet Union and China played more active role to stabilize their influence and position in the region. In this regard, the Soviet Union supported India and Afghanistan and China backed Pakistan to counter Delhi-Moscow axis in the region.

However, the US and the Soviet Union engaged each other because of their respective regional and global interests and penetration occurred due to simultaneous push from the superpowers and pull from the local powers. Moreover, superpowers penetration and interest in the Indian Ocean and Afghanistan crisis basically initiated in the result of global rivalry and not from a convergence of interest of local states. Nonetheless, the Cold War provided an opportunity for South Asian states to set their own house in order and to grope for internal solutions for regional disputes, beginning with a restructuring of regional relationships on the basis of mutual interests rather than as proxy actors. The Cold War also provided an opportunity of freedom of action that could prove to be both a responsibility and a risk. The decade ahead will be a test for South Asian ruling elites of their capacity to convert responsibilities into power and risks into opportunities. Nevertheless, the Cold War lasted for over 50 years and ended with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989.

End Notes

1. Dr. A. Z. Hilali is a Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science at the University of Peshawar (NWFP), Peshawar, Pakistan. azahilali@yahoo.co.uk
2. Kim Beazley and Ian Clark, *The Politics of Intrusion: The Superpowers and the Indian Ocean* (Sydney: Alternative Publishing Cooperative, 1979), pp. 6-23.
3. See W. H. Parker, *Mackinder: Geography as an Aid to Statecraft* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 32-56.
4. Thomas P. Thornton, "The United States and South Asia," *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 110; and see S. D. Muni, "The United States and South Asia: The Strategic Dimension," in Shelton U. Kodikara (ed.), *External Compulsions of South Asian Politics* (London: Sage Publications, 1993), p. 58.
5. Olaf Caroe, *Wells of Power* (London: Macmillan, 1951), p.42.
6. Rais Ahmad Khan, "Peace and Security in South Asia: The American Role," *Pakistan Journal of American Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 & 2, 1983, p. 10; Stephen P. Cohen, "Superpower Cooperation in South Asia," in Roger E. Kanet and Edward A. Kolodziej (ed.), *The Cold War As Cooperation: Superpower Cooperation in Regional Conflict Management* (London: Macmillan Press, 1991), pp. 281-293.
7. Robin Higham, *Intervention or Abstention: The Dilemma of American Foreign Policy* (Kentucky: The Kentucky University Press, 1975), p.202.
8. Mahmud A. Faksh, "US Policy in the Middle East: Incongruity in Political Strategy and Action," *American Arab Affairs*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Winter 1987-88), p. 38.
9. Joseph J. Malone, "American and the Arabian Peninsula: The First Two Hundred Years," *Middle East Journal* (Summer 1976), pp. 406-24.
10. See for more study about the US policy toward the countries of South Asia Norman D. Palmer, *South Asia and United States Foreign Policy* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1966); W. Norman Brown, *The United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh* (3rd ed.), (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); and Werner Levi, *The Challenge of World Politics in South and Southeast Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968).
11. US Department of State, *Bulletin* (23 March 1947), pp. 536-547.
12. Ibid.
13. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (July 1947), p. 576; and see US Department of State, *Bulletin* (22 March 1954), p. 445; and see Chester Bowles, "A US Policy for Asia," *New Leader* (22 February 1954), p. 4.
14. Report by the Foreign Relation Committee to South, Southeast and West Asia about the emerging situation of India, Pakistan and Iran. See The State Department, *Bulletin*, 3 April 1950 (Washington, D. C: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 134-56; and see also R. K. Jain, *US-South Asia Relations 1947-1982*, Vol. II, (New Delhi: Radiant, 1983), p.16.
15. US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Policy Toward Asia, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Far East and Pacific, 89th Congress., 2nd Session, 1966, pp. 80-81; and see Charles Wolf, Jr, *United States Policy and the Third World: Problems and Analysis* (Boston: Little Brown & Co, 1967), pp. 21-22.
- The American foreign policy has been anti-communist hardly needs substantiation. In this regard, the large number of statements using the anti-communist rationale to justify American policy in South Asia and specifically the alliance with Pakistan. See *US President Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington, D.C: Office of the Federal Registrar, National Archives and Records Service, 1953); Dwight David Eisenhower, 1959, p. 362; US Congress , House Committee on

Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1965, Hearings, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, p. 174.

16 US Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Mutual Security Act of 1959*,
Hearings, 86th Congress., 1st Session, 1959 p. 696; and see Selig S. Harrison, "Case
17 History of a Mistake," *New Republic* (10 August 1959), p. 17.

18 S. D. Muni, "The United States and South Asia," p. 61.

19 Sir Olaf Caroe, *Wells of Power*, pp. 180-193.

20 Rekha Datta, "US Security Policy in India and Pakistan and the Question of Nuclear
Proliferation," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XXI, No. 2
(Winter 1998), p. 29.

21 S. D. Muni, "Defence and Development in South Asia," in Bhabani Sen Gupta
(ed.), *Regional Cooperation and Development in South Asia* (Delhi: South Asian
Publishers, 1986), pp. 18-36.

22 SEATO (Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation). There were following members:
Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom
and United States. Official machinery disbanded in 1975, but obligations under the
treaty remain in force. France maintains an inactive status.

23 CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation) was based on following members UK,
Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. USA was a member of CENTO committee but not of the
organization as a whole; and see more details in US Department of State, *United
States Treaties and other International Agreements*, Vol. 5, Part, 1 (1954), pp. 854-
858.

24 R. K. Jain, *US-South Asia Relations 1947-82*, Vol. I I, (New Delhi: Radiant, 1983),
p. 16; and see *The New York Times* (16 November 1984).

25 Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters* (London: Oxford University Press,
1967), p.130; and see US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Mutual Security Act of 1959: Hearing on S. 1451, 86th congress., 1st Session., 1954,
pp. 189 and 193.

26 *The New York Times* (2 November 1953); and US Department of State, *United
States Treaties and other International Agreements*, Vol. 10, Part.1 (1959), p. 316.
The News York Times (15 October 1955); and see House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, *Mutual Security Act of 1959*, 86th Congress, 1st Session (1959), p. 109; and
see M. S. Venkataramani and H. C. Arya, "America's Military Alliance with
Pakistan: the Evolution and Course of an Uneasy Partnership," *International Studies*
(New Delhi) Vol. 8, No. 1-2 (July-October 1966), p. 104.

27 Nirad C. Chaudhuri, *The Continent of Circe* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1965),
pp. 243-244.

28 William J. Barnds, *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers* (New York: Praeger,
1972), p.103.

29 B. K. Srivastava, "The United States and South Asia," *South Asian Survey*, Vol. 4,
No. 1 (January-June 1997), p. 402.

30 Annpurna Nautiyal, "Pakistan Factor in the Post-Cold War Indo-US Relations,"
Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. XXII, No. 4 (Summer
1999), p. 34.

31 Thomas P. Thornton, "South Asia and the Great Powers," *World Affairs*, Vol. 132
(March 1970), p. 352.

32 The US interest in and Policies toward South Asia: *Hearing before the
Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, House of Representatives*, March 12, 15, 20 and 27, 1973 (Washington, D.
C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 167-182.

33 See Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), pp.
842-918.

34 Ibid.

35 Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Warner Books, 1978),
pp. 650-659.

36 *US Department of State Bulletin* (25 November 1974), p. 16.

37 See full detail of sections 699 and 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended in *Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1981* (Washington: US
Government Printing office, 1982), pp. 177-181.

38 Testimony of 30 March 1966 Foreign Assistance Act of 1966: *Hearing Before the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives*, p. 269.

39 See for detailed analysis of vital interests, Bernard Brodie, "Vital Interests: By
Whom and How Determined," in F. N. Trager and P. S. Kronenberg (ed.), *National
Security and American Society* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986), pp.
63-67.

40 See Statement by Secretary of State George P. Shultz, before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, (Washington, D. C. 27 January 1987), pp. 911-921.

41 Ashok Kapur, *Indian Ocean: Regional and International Politics* (New York:
Praeger Press, 1983), p. 177.

42 Richard Nixon, *The Real War* (New York: Warner Books, 180), pp. 25-26

43 Ibid.

44 Hermann F. Eilts, "Security Considerations in the Persian Gulf," *International
Security*, Vol. 5, (Fall 1980), pp. 79-113.

45 Along the entire 7,000 mile route from the Straits of Hormuz of Gulf to Japan, the
strategic choke point through which 40 percent of the free world's oil passes—20
million barrels each day, 800,000 barrels every hour—there is one oil tanker every
100 miles bound for Japanese ports. See Alice Rivlin, "The World Oil Market in the
1980's: Implications for the United States," in Larry A. Berg, L. M. Baird and E. A.
Varanini (ed.), *The United States and World Energy Sources* (New York: Praeger,
1982), pp. 50-56; and Richard Nixon, *Victory Without War 1999* (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1982), p. 116.

46 Richard Nixon, *Real Peace* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1983), pp. 63-65.

47 Secretary of Defence James Forrestal, cited in William B. Quandt, *Saudi Arabia in
the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security and Oil* (Washington, D. C: The Brookings
Institution, 1981), p.47; Harald Brown, *Thinking About National Security: Defence
and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), p.142;
and see Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft and Richard Murphy, "Differentiated
Containment," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 3 (May/June 1997), pp. 20-30.

48 Michael C. Hudson, *Alternative Approaches to the Arab-Israel Conflict: A
Comparative Analysis of the Principal Actors* (Washington, D. C: Georgetown
University Press, 1984), pp. 175- 177.

49 Harry V. Hodson, *Twentieth Century Empire* (London: Faber & Faber, 1948), p.
158; and see US Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Report of a
Special Subcommittee Following an Inspection Tour* (Washington, D.C: US
Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 35-47.

50 *New York Times* (5 February 1955); and Department of State, *Bulletin* (15 June
1955), p. 338.

51 *Dawn* (13 March 1951); and see *The New York Times* (26 March 1951).

52 US Department of State, *Bulletin*, XXVIII (15 June 1953), p. 833.

53 *New York Times* (3 January 1952).

54 *Dawn* (2 August 1962).

55 *The New York Times* (8 December 1963).

56 *US Department of State Bulletin*, XVII (15 October 1963), p. 654; and US
Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, *Foreign Assistance and Related
Agencies Appropriations for 1966: Hearing Kashmir 10871*, 89th Congress, 1st
Session, 1965, pp. 15-17.

57 Richard Nixon, *The Real War*, p. 98.
58 Ibid., p. 80.
59 See *Department of State Bulletin* (July 1982), p. 19.
60 Jonathan P. Stern, "Gulf Oil Strategy," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 3 (Spring 1980),
pp. 67- 70.
61 Lawrence Ziring, "Soviet Strategic Interests in South Asia: Domestic Determinants
and Global Dimensions," in Raju G. C. Thomas (ed.), *The Great Power Triangle
and Asian Security* (Lexington: D. C Heath, 1983), pp. 43-76; and Tucker,
"Sovietology and Russian History," pp. 172-176.
62 George Perkovich, "The Soviet Union: Moscow Turns East," *The Atlantic*, Vol.
260, No. 6 (December 1987), p.2; and Matthew Evangelists, "internal and External
Constraints on Grand Strategy: the Soviet Case," in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur
A. Stein (ed.), *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1993), pp. 154-178.
63 Edgar Sallanceo, "Indian Ocean: An Ampiteater or a Backwater?," *Defence Journal*
(Karachi) (May 1997), p. 17.
64 V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23 (Moscow: Progressive Publishers, 1970),
quoted in Sedhan Mukherju, *India's Economic Relations With USA and USSR* (New
Delhi: Sterling Publishers, Ltd, 1978), p.182; Hosmer and Wolfe, *Soviet Policy and
Practice Toward Third World Conflicts* (----), p. 163; and *Izvestia* (16 November
1917).
65 Jawaharlal Nehru, *Soviet Russia* (Bombay: 1929), p.3; and see Moonis Ahmar, *The
Soviet Role in South Asia 1969-1987* (Karachi: Area Study Centre for Europe,
University of Karachi, 1989), p.18.
66 See Thomas P. Thornton, "The USSR in Asia," in Wilcox, Rose, and Boyd, *Asia
and the International System* (Cambridge, Mass: Winthrop, 1972), pp. 43-67.
67 Monorajan Bezboruah, *US Strategy in the Indian Ocean* (New York: Praeger Press,
1977), p. 62; David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race* (new Haven,
Conn: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 36-43; and see *Pravda* (8 March 1978).
68 Jiri Valenta and Shannon R. Butler, "Soviet Interests, Objectives and Policy Options
in Southwest Asia," in Shirin Tahir Kheli (ed.), *US Strategic Interests in Southwest
Asia* (New York: Praeger Press, 1982), p.102; and Andrei Grechko, "Doklad
Ministra Oboroni SSSR Marshal Sovetskogo Soiuza A. Grechko, "Kommunist
Vooryzhennykh Sil, No. 8 (August 1973), pp. 8-15.
69 John C. Griffiths, *Afghanistan: Key to a Continent* (Boulder: Westview Press,
1981), p. 38.
70 Shirin Tahir Kheli, *US Strategic Interests in Southwest Asia*, p. 103; Fyodor
Mikhailovich Dostoyevsky, *Dnevnik Pisatelya* (The Diary of a Writer Diary of a
Writer), translated by Kenneth Lantz, (Illinois: Northwestern University Press,
1993), p. 45.
71 Konstantin Mochulsky, *Dostoevsky: His Life and Work*, translated by Michael A.
Minihan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p.646; and Boris
Ponomarev, "The World Situation and the Revolutionary Process," *Problemy mira i
sotsializma*, No. 6 (June 1974), translated in FBIS, 25 June 1974.
72 R. J. Sentag and J. S. Beddie, *Nazi- Soviet Relations* (Washington, DC.:
Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 258-59; and see *Pravda* (18 September
1945).
73 Thomas W. Robinson, "Soviet Policy in Asia," in William E. Griffith, *The Soviet
Empire: Expansion & Détente* Vol. IX (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1976), p. 285.
74 Surjit Mansingh, "Is There A Soviet-Indian Strategic Partnership?," in Hafeez
Malik (ed.), *Dilemmas of National Security and Cooperation in India and Pakistan*
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 143.
75 See Lok Sabha, *Debates* (1 March 1954), Vol. 1, Part II, C. 970; *Nehru's Speeches-*

Vol. III: 1953-1957 (New Delhi: Longfellow, 1958), pp. 301-337.

76 Although since 1955, Soviet maps did not show all of the Kashmir territory to be under Indian control. See *Daily Telegraph* (London) 11 July 1955; and *Pravda* (17 October 1955).

77 Nake Kamrany, *Peaceful Competition in Afghanistan: American and Soviet Models For Economic Aid* (Washington, D. C.: Communication Services Company, 1969), pp. 53-54; Aslam Siddiqi, *Pakistan Seeks Security* (Lahore: Longmans, 1960), p. 93-98; *Kabul Times* (11 December 1955); and G. F. Hudson, "Soviet Policy in Asia," *Soviet Survey* (July 1955), pp. 1-13.

78 *The Current Digest of Soviet Press*, Vol. XII (6 April 1960), pp. 6-7; and *Pakistan Times* (28 March 1960); Hafeez-ur-Rehman Khan, "Pakistan's Relations with the USSR," *Pakistan Horizon* (1st Quarter- 1961); and *New Times* (Moscow), No. 22 (1960).

79 *Pravda* (25 March 1961); *Dawn* (27 March 1961); and *New Times* (Moscow), No. 23 (1961).

80 *Izvestia* (28 March 1961); and *Kabul Times* (27 March 1961).

81 National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, *Official Reports* 2 (17 July 1963), p. 1665; and *Pakistan Times* (18 July 1963).

82 Elizabeth K. Valkenier, *The Soviet Union and the Third World* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), p.52.

83 Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, *South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers* (London: Macmillan, 1986), p.213; *Pakistan News Digest*, Karachi (May 1 1968); and *Izvestia* (13 May 1968).

84 *Pravda*, (24 August 1965); see also *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 17, No. 34 (15 September 1965), pp. 15-16.

85 Linda Racioppi, *Soviet Policy Towards South Asia Since 1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.5; and see *Pravda* (19 January 1966).

86 Strobe Talbott, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little Brown and Co, 1974), p. 308; *The Times* (London) 6 December 1966; and *Hindu Weekly* (15 November 1966).

87 Bhabani Sen Gupta, *Soviet-Asian Relations in the 1970s and Beyond* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1984, p. 140; Harish Kapur, "India and the Soviet Union," *Survey* (Winter 1971), pp. 184-195; and G. F. Hudson, "Soviet Policy in Asia," *Soviet Survey* (July 1966), pp. 4-23.

88 Statements by N. A. Bulgarian and N. S. Khrushchev in India, Burma, and Afghanistan, *NewsTimes*, supplement no. 52, 1955, p.22; *The Statesman*, 19 December 1955; Lawrence Ziring, "Afghanistan: The Contemporary Pivot of Great Power Relations," in Raju G. C. Thomas (ed.), *The Great Power Triangle and Asian Security* (Lexington: D. C Heath, 1983), p.53.

89 Robert H. Donaldson, *The Soviet-Indian Alignment: Quest For Influence*, Vol. 16 (Denver: University of Denver 1979), pp. 18-22; *The Times of India* (18 October 1960); *The New York Times* (29 December 1960).

90 *The Statesman*, 19 December 1955; and see Lawrence Ziring, "Afghanistan: The Contemporary Pivot of Great Power Relations," in Raju G. C. Thomas (ed.), *The Great Power Triangle and Asian Security* (Lexington: D. C Heath, 1983), p.53.

91 Lawrence Ziring, "Afghanistan: The Contemporary Pivot of Great Power Relations," in Raju G. C. Thomas (ed.), *The Great Power Triangle and Asian Security* (Lexington: D. C Heath, 1983), p.53.

92 The concept of an Asian Collective Security system was created by President Brezhnev in a speech to the June 1969 International Conference of Communist and Workers Parties. See more details I. L. Brezhnev, For Greater Unity of Communists For a Fresh Upsurge of Anti-Imperialist Struggle, speech of 7 June 1969 (Moscow: Novosti, 1969), p.53.

93 Geoffrey Jukes and Ian Clark, "The Soviets and Asian Collective Security 1969-74," in Roger E. Kanet (ed.), *Soviet Economic and Political Relations With the Developing World* (London: Praeger Press, 1975), p. 140.

94 Air Marshal Noor Khan, *Times of India* (7 May 1969); *Hindu Weekly* (22 July 1970); and *Morning News* (11 July 1970).

95 See G. W. Choudhry, *The Last Days of United Pakistan* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), pp. 1-35; *Dawn* (15 November 1971); and *Observers* (26 September 1971).

96 *Pravda* (9 April 1971); *New York Times* (18 April 1971); and *Dawn* (7 May 1971).

97 See full text of Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 in S. Mansingh, *India's Search for Power* (New Delhi: Longfellow, 1984), pp. 213-25; J. P. Chiddick, "Indo-Soviet Relations 1966-1971," *Millennium*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1974), pp. 17-36; S. Nihal Singh, *The Yogi and the Bear* (London: Mansell, 1986), ch. 5; and Robert C. Horn, *Soviet-Indian Relations: Issues and Influence* (New York: Praeger, 1982), chs. 2 & 3.

98 T. N. Kaul, *Reminiscences Discreet and Indiscreet* (New Delhi: Lancers, 1982), p. 255.

99 The treaty was regarded everywhere as Soviet backing for Indira Gandhi's government. See for more details Alexander Gorev, *Indira Gandhi* (Moscow: Novosti, 1989), p. 40.

100 Singh, *The Yogi and the Bear*, pp. 89-96; and Horn, *Soviet-Indian Relations*, p. 73.

101 W. Howard Wriggins, "US Interests in South Asia and the Indian Ocean," in Lawrence Zaring (ed.), *The Subcontinent in World Politics: India, Its Neighbour and the Great Powers* (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 211.

102 Roger E. Kanet and Donna Bahry, *Soviet Economic and Political Relations With the Developing World* (New York: Praeger Press, 1975), p. 218.

103 Kurt London, *The Soviet Union in World Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1987), p. 204; and see *Peking News* (June 1987).

104 See O. M. Smolansky, "Moscow and the Persian Gulf: An Analysis of Soviet Ambitions and Potential," *Orbis*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring 1970), pp. 94-97.

105 *Ibid.*

106 Carol R. Saivetz, *The Soviet Union and the Gulf in the 1980s* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 1.

107 For details, see "Oil and Soviet Policy in the Middle East," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Spring 1972), pp. 149-160.

108 Adeed Dawisha, "The Soviet Union in the Arab World: The Limits to Superpower Influence," in Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, *The Soviet Union in the Middle East: Policies and Perspectives* (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1982), pp. 8-9; and see Robert O. Freedman, "The Soviet Union and the Middle East: The High Cost of Influence," *Naval War College Review*, (January 1972), pp. 15-29.

109 Karen Dawisha, *Soviet Foreign Policy Toward Egypt* (London: Macmillan Press, 1979), p. 11; Bettie M. Smolansky and Oles M. Smolansky, "Soviet and Chinese influence in the Persian Gulf," in Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World* (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 133.

110 British Petroleum Company Ltd., *British Statistical Review*, 1981, p. 4.

111 G. Melkov, "The Sources of Tension," *Karansaya Zvezda* (9 June 1974); *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 32, No. 50 (January 14, 1981), p. 6; and see also A. Yodfat, *The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 134-137.