

## ENGAGEMENT AND ESTRANGEMENT IN U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

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### Abstract

*Over the last six decades, relations between the USA and Pakistan have seen many ups and downs; punctuated by intense engagement and strong and distinct estrangement. Each country has tried to influence the other with its own peculiar needs. Pakistan once viewed, as the most allied ally when suited to US interests in 50s, became the most sanctioned ally of the United States in 90s. The warmness of their relations drifted in the wake of shifting priorities or differences over issues of regional conflict with India over Kashmir, democracy concerns, nuclear weapons and security issues. The intensity of relations varied from one extreme to that of completely ignoring the other as in 1971, to that of urgent action as was seen immediately after the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets in December 1979 or during the war on terrorism after 9/11. The pattern of inter states relation emerging with every turn of events over the last five years or more, and the changing tones of Bush Administration indicate that sky once again seems to be overcast. The rhetoric of “do more” and linking continuation of US aid to the fulfillment of new demands seem to replicate history once again. With every day passing, Pakistan seems moving towards the other side of the fence and looming threat of suspension of aid is becoming more obvious.*

U.S. - Pakistan relations in the last six decades have been tumultuous and moved in a cyclical pattern with recurrent ups and downs, with frequent alternating episodes of close partnership and sharp friction—reflecting engagement and estrangement in global and regional geopolitics. They have flourished in periods of international tensions, such as in the fifties, again in eighties, (and now in the days beyond 9/11), and have

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deteriorated in conditions of détente, as in the sixties and seventies and again in the nineties.<sup>1</sup> The United States and Pakistan relations, broadly speaking have been synchronized on the same wavelength during the Eisenhower, Nixon and Reagan presidencies. During the Kennedy, Johnson, Carter, Bush, and Clinton administrations, however, policy differences have been more pronounced and significant.

Pakistan has had the distinction of being the ‘America’s most allied ally in Asia<sup>2</sup> and the ‘most sanctioned ally of the United States’.<sup>3</sup> Historically, beginning with the less than sympathetic attitude in Washington towards Pakistan movement in undivided India both the states established diplomatic relations in 1947, shortly after Pakistan gained its independence.<sup>4</sup> Since then, relations have witnessed alternating episodes of close partnership and sharp friction—reflecting the ups and downs of global and regional geopolitics. When an impoverished Pakistan was struggling to get on its feet for survival after the partition against a more powerful hostile India; it was gauged as a potential partner of US for containing Soviet expansion in the Middle East, South Asia and South East Asia. Washington saw no difficulty in aligning itself with Pakistan. The U.S.-Pakistan alliances of SEATO and CENTO meant to contain the Communist threat through the '50s, got losing their importance in the '60s during the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies and got fractured during the period of Jimmy Carter. Whereas, Pakistan earns the credit for facilitating Sino-U.S. détente in 70s and the successful joint struggle against Soviet aggression in Afghanistan in the '80s leading to the triumph of the free world and a virtual end of the Cold War. Thereby, allowing decisive tilt of global balance of power in Washington's favor. However, with the

disintegration of USSR, Pakistan, the front line state also lost its significance for the United States. The Post 90s period witnessed drastic shift in the relationship, the shifting position of its most allied ally into a most sanctioned ally once again on one pretext or the other. Pressler Amendments, post nuclear sanctions of 98, President Bill Clinton's five hours visit to Pakistan and five days in India were few of the many reasons that may suffice to conclude that Pakistan has lost its relevance to US interests. Pakistan was relegated to most sanctioned ally and India took over as a most preferred ally at strategic scene. Then came 9/11 and plans to unleash a cold-blooded response against its presumed perpetrators. The geo-strategic position of Pakistan helps reclaim its lost relevance for American interests and brought Pakistan back to the center of the American ambitions. The role Pakistan played in the war against terror, move in isolating Taliban pockets of resistance from their sympathizers, and manhunt pursuit of Al-Quaida, once again kicked bilateral relationship between Pakistan and the United States on an upward trajectory.

However, after the few years of warmth and love in relationship between the leadership of both countries, Pakistan once again seems to be put on the mat by the U.S in pursuit of its interests in Central Asia, Strategic partnership with India, hostility towards Iran, rising intimacy between the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, fight for secularization in Muslim World, recognition of Israel, India-Iran Gas PipeLine, etc. Renewed impetus of resistance in Afghanistan and ever rising hatred against American Imperialism in Muslim World in general and Pakistan in Particular are becoming pretexts for changing mood in American foreign policy towards Pakistan.

This paper attempts to offer an insight into the ups and downs of the ties of these disenchanted allies with the aim of forecasting likely future of their relations. In accomplishing this aim, the paper adopts to discuss in a straightforward chronological narrative on U.S.-Pakistan relations, covering all the key benchmarks of the relationship, Kashmir, Indo-Pakistan relations, American Cold War alliances, the 1965 and 1971 wars, the China factor, Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons, Afghan war against the Soviet Union and post 9/11 war against terrorism in great details. At the end the paper may prompt the reader to answer the questions;

- Did we learn any lesson from the history while moving away from the roller coaster pattern of our past?
- When and how our present engagement marked with the status of special non-NATO relationship revived since 9/11 is likely to transforme in near future?

### **HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE**

The history of US-Pakistan relations can be defined into three distinct spells, each having phase of intense engagement followed by a period of estrangement even moving towards periods of sanctions. Each spell is characterized by shifting American perceptions of Pakistan's strategic importance. According to Ambassador Kux, most significant were the last three shifts that occurred — one under the Reagan presidency when an anti-Soviet alliance was made with Pakistan, another during the G.H.W. Bush and Clinton presidencies when the removal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan shifted focus negatively onto Pakistan's nuclear proliferation, and finally under G.W. Bush, where Pakistani participation

in the War on Terror has ushered in a new era of cooperation.<sup>5</sup> Such a pattern of each spell represents its changing status and the today's scenario questions whether the United States was heading for the old cyclic path. However, today the press is full of details concerning the frustrations of the Pakistanis who make no secret of their resentment with American tendency to exploit them and dump them.

### **PHASES OF ENGAGEMENT & ESTRANGEMENT**

In total, the period of US-Pakistan relation defines three major engagements. The first two engagements fall in the Cold War era and the 3<sup>rd</sup>, the present one emerges from post 9/11 War against terrorism. The first of the US engagements with Pakistan occurred during the height of the Cold War, from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s; the second was during the Afghan Jihad in the 1980s, again lasting about a decade; and the third engagement dates to September 11, 2001, and relates to the war on terrorism

#### **PHASE-I**

**Cold War Engagement:** The U.S.-Pakistan relationship began during the Cold War especially after the Korean War when US was looking for allies to fight in containing communism.<sup>6</sup> The credit for these relations should go not to Pakistan, but to India, or rather to its first Prime Minister Nehru who took India into the Soviet shadow under the name of non-alignment. Economic and military imbalances made Pakistan deeply conscious of the disparity and to look for the ways to redress it. Tensions with India showed no signs of abatement and no respite or headway on Kashmir Issue were forthcoming. These heightened security concerns and need for economic development impelled Pakistan to look towards the United States for support, which was also in search of allies in Asia

to check the expanding lines of Communist influence. Pakistan began recognition of its strategic importance when in March 1949, US joint Chief of Staff note significance of Karachi-Lahore area ‘as a base for air operations’ against the Soviet Union and ‘as a staging area for forces engaged in the defence or recapture of Middle East oil areas’.<sup>7</sup> Pakistan was the point at which the alliances geographically converged and thus was a linchpin in their continuity.<sup>8</sup> Pakistan’s geo- strategic location and willingness to join the US sponsored Alliances made it member of SEATO (1954), Baghdad Pact (1955) and the bilateral agreements of Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement-1954, and 1959 Pakistan-US Cooperation Agreement. According to the Agreement of Cooperation, the United States was required, under certain circumstances, to assist Pakistan if she became the victim of aggression.<sup>9</sup>

On finding an equalizer against India, by 1957, ‘Pakistan was no more short of men and material’<sup>10</sup> and became ‘the greatest deterrence against aggression’.<sup>11</sup> Joining the Baghdad Pact and SEATO gave Pakistan a strengthened claim on US resources and, in turn, the US acquired an even larger stake in Pakistan’s well being. Pakistan thus became ‘the most allied ally’ of the United States in Asia.<sup>12</sup> Altogether, over the period of 1954-1962, U.S. economic assistance to Pakistan amounted to \$3.5 billion, not including \$1.372 billion for defence support and purchase of equipment.<sup>13</sup> Whereas, India was given \$4 billions only in economic aid during 1959-63.<sup>14</sup> President Nixon used the Pakistani links with China to start a secret diplomacy with China, which culminated with Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to China in July 1971 while he was visiting Pakistan. The Chinese relationship was vital for the US as it was trying to fix the mess in its Vietnam policy. In return Pakistan bore a brunt of costs of alliances in fulfilling the services to US interests:

- Pakistan had undertaken to strengthen her defence commitments against the Communists without a categorical assurance with regards to her security against India. Acted as a front line state against Soviet Communism, and created annoyance /enmity in India, China, and USSR on CEATO.
- It supported Eisenhower Doctrine with full satisfaction.<sup>15</sup>
- Giving extra territorial rights, USA was allowed to set up secret intelligence base under the guise of ‘communication centre’ at Badaber near Peshawar.<sup>16</sup> It also served as the base to be used by high-level U-2 ‘spy in the sky’ surveillance aircrafts for illegal flights over the Soviet Union.<sup>17</sup>

**Period of Estrangement:** The U.S.-Pakistan alliance partnership of 50s, however, proved detrimental to Pakistan’s national interests in 60s. The first period of thaw or disengagement or estrangement, what so ever it may be called, speaks of the period stemming from differing perceptions between the decision makers of both states. Pakistan's opening to China in the early 1960s and the shift in U.S. interest toward India to balance China's growing power in post Sino-India conflict distanced them further. Pakistani perceptions of what is best for Pakistan and its national security have not been shared by America, especially when it concerned India. As then-secretary of state Dean Rusk says, “Fear, distrust, and hatred of India” mean “we cannot rely on Pakistan to act rationally and in what we think would be in its own interest.”<sup>18</sup> Following points suffice to remark that Pakistan was found looser at the end with its friendship with USA:

- Kennedy and Johnson, followed by Nixon in the White House did not stand by to the pledges they made in the agreements. In Article 1 of the April 1959 Pakistan-US Cooperation Act, US pledged that it 'regards as vital to its national interests and to world peace the preservation of independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan.'<sup>19</sup> It further stated that 'in case of aggression against Pakistan... the United States of America... will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon...in order to assist Pakistan in its requests. And in Article II, the US pledged 'to assist Pakistan in the preservation of its national independence and integrity and in the effective promotion of economic development'. USA failed to honour its agreements and SEATO members did not consider 1965 War or 1971 Indian military intervention in East Pakistan to come under the purview of the treaty. When East Pakistan was severed and turned into Bangladesh, Pakistan withdrew from the organization, in November 1972.<sup>20</sup>
- During the post Sino India conflict of 1962, US and Britain continued to supply India with military aid including arming of six Indian divisions for mountain warfare and enabling India to raise her standing army from 11 to 22 divisions.<sup>21</sup> The gradual slashing down of both economic and military aid to Pakistan since 1962, and progressive increase to India widened the imbalance between India and Pakistan. The American policy shift was tantamount to abandoning friends and embracing neutrals. Resultant outcome to these US military and economic aids were Indian bold adventures of marching in the



village Chaknot of Azad Kashmir in 1963, and; declared integration of the occupied territory of Jammu and Kashmir with India by PM Shastri in October 1964. For USA it was not more than a diplomatic “shock and surprise”.<sup>22</sup>

- Suspension of military assistance to both sides after the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971 is regarded as a stab in Pakistan’s trust over America as Pakistan was the only country which for over a decade had received military equipment solely from the U.S and her defence establishments were accustomed to American weapons and thinking. Sudden drying up of the source strengthened the perception among Pakistanis that the United States was not a reliable ally. Eventually, with the re-orientation of its strategic interests in the region, the United States dumped Pakistan with its sacrifices for a decade or so, until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.
- Singled out by the communists and neutralists as their special target. Moscow threw its powerful weight behind India and announced full support for Paushtoonistan.<sup>23</sup>
- The policy of alignment also damaged Pakistan’s image in the world, stained her relations with the Muslim Arab world, and drove her towards isolation.<sup>24</sup> Suffered a serious set back in relations with Egypt, Syria and Arab League nations due to its active involvement in Baghdad Pact. Saudi called it ‘stabs in the heart of the Arabs and Muslim states.’<sup>25</sup>
- Pakistan had incurred the hostility of the Soviet Union, which openly supported India against Pakistan. Assured of the Soviet

Veto, India renounced its obligation for a plebiscite in Kashmir. The great disappointment was, American failure to throw its weight behind a just settlement of Kashmir dispute.

- United States helped encourage undemocratic tendencies in the country, as U.S. patronage of the Pakistan army raised the military's national profile. The military came to dominate the country's politics through a pro-Western alliance. At the time, Pakistan's religious profile caused little concern to the United States; in fact, it suited the United States as the religion provided for both a measure of internal stability and a defense against communism.
- Noam Chomsky states in his famous work *Detering Democracy* that with the complicity of the Reagan -Bush administration in the drug rackets in Central America as part of their Contra support operation, Pakistan had to become one of the major international centers of the heroin trade. “The U.S. government has for several years received, but declined to investigate, reports of heroin trafficking by some Afghan guerrillas, Pakistan military officers and military establishment.”<sup>26</sup>

## PHASE-II

**Engagement Against Communism:** During the 1980s, the struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan provided a new opportunity to bring the two countries once again together on the pretext of containing communism. However, since the departure of the Soviets from Afghanistan, disintegration of USSR and the end of the Cold War,

relations once again were plagued by differences. The period from 1980 to 1988 ushered most intense period of U.S.-Pakistani cooperation and Pakistan again became a frontline ally to check Soviet expansionism. Pakistan became a recipient of aid package amounting \$1.625 billion in economic assistance and \$1.5 billion in military assistance<sup>27</sup> spread over six years, and exempted from Symington and Glenn Amendments.<sup>28</sup> In return, Pakistan became a key transit country for arms supplies to the Afghan resistance, and hosting more than 3.5 million Afghan refugees, many of whom have yet to return home. The two countries collaborated to expel the Soviet army from Afghanistan, which ultimately dismantled the Soviet empire. However, the reward Pakistan received on his role in dismantling of USSR was Pressler Amendment which stopped most of its economic and all military aid and suspended deliveries of major military equipment including F-16 fighter aircraft ordered and paid by Pakistan in 1989. Since the US and Pakistani interests had diverted at this point, with the Soviets retreating from Afghanistan and the US involved in the Middle East, the Pakistanis felt isolated by their “old friend” and “ally”.

**Second Estrangement:** As pointed out earlier that when the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, so did American strategic interests in Pakistan. Post Cold War, U.S. foreign policy in South Asia can be viewed independent of any prism of rivalry with the Soviet Union, emphasizing good relations with each, based on their intrinsic importance to the U.S. and the region. India -centered relations, controlling proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems and preserving regional stability in South Asia were declared policy objectives of the United States. U.S. sanctions contributed to the widespread feeling among Pakistanis that the United

States had once again used their country and discarded it when it was no longer needed. Whenever Pakistan's help was critical to the success of U.S interests, all the irritants like democracy, nuclear proliferation and conflict with India, are overlooked by the United States and US turns its back when her own interests are met. It was U.S. on whose instructions Pakistan allowed its land to be used as a sanctuary, training ground, and staging area for Jihadies. But, the United States walked away from the region as soon as the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989 and hit its close ally in the struggle for Afghanistan's freedom, with sanctions and leaving behind the mess for Pakistan to clean. The Pressler sanctions were applied when Pakistan's co-operation was no longer needed following the demise of the Soviet Union. Crisis-ridden first half of the nineties became a crucial period in post-cold war relations between the two countries, unfolding nuclear issue, terrorism and narcotics one after the other. Besides, threatening Pakistan for labeling as a state sponsor of terrorism, more sanctions were imposed on Pakistan under the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) for allegedly receiving missile technology from China.

During the period, Pakistan's status of most favoured allied ally changed to most sanctioned ally by number of legislations made against Pakistan.<sup>29</sup> Pakistan was left alone to clear the debris of the America's war in Afghanistan, in the shape of over three million Afghan refugees, proliferation of narcotics and weapons, and simmering Civil War in Afghanistan. Resultantly, Pakistan's Socio-economic development and security concerns suffered serious set back, and negatively affected the balance of power in the region. Both the countries were unwilling to narrow down their differences on handling of Kashmir dispute with India, with the Taliban, and with the nuclear question, and bilateral

frictions continued to worsen further. This period witnessed the rise of the Taliban, the Kashmir jihad, the Kargil operation, and the derailing of democracy on number of occasions.

**Post 9/11 Relationship:** After the abhorrent incidents of 9/11, the world once again saw Pakistan a front-line state in US led war in Afghanistan. Thus the 9/11 presented another chance for both countries to marry up again, and Pakistan has no other option under the threat of dire consequences if it refused to cooperate with the United States.<sup>30</sup> Reportedly, "American officials had told Musharraf's government that Washington would use every lever short of war to punish Pakistan unless it cooperated".<sup>31</sup> President Musharraf promptly extended his full support to America in the war against terrorism. He readily agreed to all requests by Secretary of State Colin Powell. According to a number of sources, his positive response exceeded expectations.<sup>32</sup> Responding to the American demarche to choose sides between the U.S. and the Taliban<sup>33</sup>, Pakistan opted for fateful decision to sacrifice more than two decades of Pakistan's strategic investment in Afghanistan. Pakistan's decision to side with America was motivated by the objective of pursuing four key Pakistani interests: the country's security, economic growth, and the need to safeguard its "strategic nuclear and missile assets," and the Kashmir cause.<sup>34</sup> However, the hope of having a say in Afghanistan's future political arrangements and peaceful resolution of Kashmir from the American war against terrorism remained illusions. Rather, Islamabad was pressurized to alter its national course on Kashmir, withdraw its support from freedom movement in Kashmir, and declare some of the echelons of the freedom movement as terrorist organization, banning their operation at its soil. Besides, the few voices for government support, the overall public reaction to Pakistan's U turns on

its long tested policies under U.S. pressure was largely skeptical. Pakistan cooperation with the United States included; granting logistics facilities, sharing intelligence, and capturing and handing over al-Qaida suspects, sealing off its western border and made two naval bases, three air force bases, and its airspace available to the U.S. military.<sup>35</sup>

In return, the United States extended grants to Pakistan equaling \$1 billion and wrote off \$1 billion in debt. In June 2003, the U.S. announced a \$3 billion for five years assistance package for Pakistan, with roughly equal amounts going to economic aid and security assistance. Between 2002 and 2005 the U.S. provided Pakistan with US\$ 2.63 billion in direct aid.<sup>36</sup> Additionally, a framework agreement on trade and investment has been signed, and the two countries have begun negotiating a bilateral investment treaty. On the security front, the U.S. approved an arms-sale package that includes purchase of P3C Orion aircraft, surveillance radars, helicopters and radio communication system in order to improve Pakistan capacity to support U.S led forces in War on Terrorism. Besides, offering F-16 fighter jets to refurbish its Air Force, Pakistan has been declared to be a major non- NATO ally of the United States.<sup>37</sup> According to Najmuddin A. Shaikh, former foreign secretary to Pakistan, that up till now Pakistan has received some \$10 billion in aid much of it as payment for the facilities Pakistan has provided for the war in Afghanistan.<sup>38</sup> On political front, the current U.S. engagement has also provided legitimacy to General Musharaf's regime like previous engagements did for General Ayub Khan and General Zia ul Haq. Musharaf regime, which was asked for road map to restoration of democracy, is now a days being provided with unqualified backing by the Washington. The regime that has gone bombing their own people in

Waziristan and Bajore, is being perceived as the only reliable defence against fundamentalists' takeover in Pakistan.

The current U.S.-Pakistan engagement may be focused on cooperation in the war on terrorism, especially on building the military-intelligence partnership between the two countries, but it is not limited to it. Pakistan's domestic order, especially its weak institutional architecture, stillborn political process, underdeveloped economy, poor educational system, unsure civil society, and simmering internal tensions, are also the by-product of this engagement. Despite all that has been done by Pakistan and its military, the military commanders overseeing Operation Enduring Freedom are complaining that fugitives of Taliban and Al Qaida, attack coalition forces in Afghanistan, and then escape across the Pakistani frontier. They expressed dismay at the slow pace of progress in capturing wanted fugitives in Pakistan and urged Islamabad to do more to secure its rugged western border area. Such Taliban activities on Pakistan's soil are more attributed to Pakistan's lack of will than lack of capacity. These changing perceptions are obvious in the statements of not less than President Bush himself. On 15 September 2006, in a news conference, Bush said, "*Pakistan is a sovereign nation. In order for us to send thousands of troops into a sovereign nation, we have got to be invited by the government of Pakistan*". Just after a week, President Bush abruptly abandoned five years of rhetoric about respecting Pakistan's territorial sovereignty and brashly declared on CNN that he was ready to send U.S. forces into Pakistan without Pakistan's permission, if the fugitive terrorist ring-leader was spotted there. The Bush Administration officials have even started expressing concern that elements of Pakistan's intelligence agency might be assisting Taliban. Vice President Dick Cheney's recent sudden visit to Pakistan was to convey tough message to

Pakistan with dire consequences to default. The turning of tide is further evidenced by the U.S. Senate's recent action, which asked to link flow of American aid to Pakistan, with the condition of Pakistan's performance in War on Terror and anti Taliban role. These pointers lead to the conclusion that if American and NATO soldiers continue to be killed with the same ratio and Taliban and AL Qaida leadership remains at large then the chances for change in US policy towards Pakistan in general and the regime in particular are more likely.

Whenever we did not maintain and sustain a deep relationship, both our countries suffered negative consequences. We don't have to look too far to find evidence in this connection. The premature U.S. disengagement from Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal accentuated the civil war and created conditions threatening regional and global peace. Pakistan was left alone to pick up the pieces. We experienced the worst consequences of the drug and Kalashnikov culture and witnessed the rise in extremist tendencies in the region. This also led to immense suffering and the tragedy which happened on 9/11.<sup>39</sup>

## CONCLUSIONS

History of Pakistan-US relationship with all its engagements and estrangements followed by the subsequent discussion on each phase of these relations, one could reach certain conclusions as:

- U.S. Pakistan relations flourished in the periods of international tensions, such as in the fifties, again in eighties, and now in post 9/11. These relations have deteriorated in conditions of détente, as in the sixties and seventies and again in the nineties.<sup>40</sup> What has been unusual about the relationship between the United



States and Pakistan is that their spells of close ties have been, and may continue to be, single-issue engagements of limited or uncertain duration.

- The United States strengthened Pakistan's defense capabilities and potential for economic development. But in doing so the United States also helped encourage undemocratic tendencies in the country, as U.S. patronage of the Pakistan army raised the military's national profile. During each engagement there has been either a military or military-dominated government in Pakistan, while in Washington, the policy direction on Pakistan has largely been in the hands of the White House, Pentagon, and the CIA.
- As soon as the United States achieved its objectives vis-à-vis Pakistan in past engagements, U.S.-Pakistan policy consensus would break down. Pakistan was either consigned to benign neglect or hit with a succession of punitive sanctions that left in their trail resentment and a sense of betrayal. Such highs and lows U turns turned into an *Oedipus complex* or a love-hate relationship between the two and generated anti Americanism. This anti-Americanism is mainly triggered by a perception that the United States has not been a reliable ally, it used and abused Pakistan when needed by his national interests, left it alone and abandoned after every engagement, and has not helped Pakistan in its conflict with India. Like previous engagement, the current relationship may yet leave in its wake serious problems that may have to be addressed in the future at a much higher cost.

- Whenever Pakistan has lost out its democracy to military dictatorship, at that particular moment some United States' strategic expediency would call for perpetuation of Pakistan Army in Pakistan to serve United States national security interest. In return all of the military regimes in Pakistan's sad history were granted legitimacy by the US. The sad conclusion from the above is that it is not only the Pakistan Army which stands as an impregnable wall between the Pakistani people and their yearning for democracy and human rights but also it is the United State's patronage which buttresses the Pakistan Army rule.
- The above conclusion leads to another one that the United States prefers military rule to democracy in Pakistan. Military dictators, murderer of nascent democracies, did Pakistan's provision of military bases to America in 60s, arranging Henry Kissinger's secret trip in 1970 to Beijing in 1970<sup>41</sup>, and making Pakistan as staging area for the covert and overt war in Afghanistan against USSR in 80s. Washington's backing of General Musharraf since 9/11 has reinforced the traditional popular belief that the United States prefers military dictators who lacking legitimacy on the home front, easily submit to its demands.<sup>42</sup>
- From the Pakistani perspective, the legacy of past dealings with the Americans has been negative. A sense of resentment and distrust of the United States pervades in Pakistani public. Many Pakistanis sincerely believe that their country has been unfairly and unjustly treated. Three main complaints were repeatedly pointed out to this author: first, Washington's refusal to help Pakistan during the 1965 war with India; second, the United

States discarding of Pakistan “like a used Kleenex” when it was no longer needed after the Afghan war; and, third, the discriminatory nature of U.S. nuclear sanctions, which—until the May 1998 nuclear tests—hit only Pakistan and did not affect India.

- Mutual relations between the two countries are based on convergence of common interests from time to time. When the US required U2 surveillance flight facilities and an intelligence base against the Soviets (1959-1968), backdoor diplomacy with the Chinese (1970-72), covert operations against the Red Army in Afghanistan (1980-88) and recently the war against terrorism (2001), it has extended its best hand forward in terms of military and economic aid as well as support for military dictators.
- The relationship has also shared problems typical of U.S. ties with a small country. Pakistan has traditionally responded to regional impulses, while the United States tends to consider global dynamics in its relationships. The United States has historically made light of Pakistan's security concerns and underestimated the strength of Pakistan's commitment to its nuclear program, and Pakistan has failed to see that an inflated U.S. - Pakistan engagement had no staying power.<sup>43</sup>
- US looked aside politely while its ally Pakistan was developing nuclear weapon in 80s, annually endorsing the pretence that Pakistan was not doing so.<sup>44</sup> This practice continued till the American national interests in the area were met with and Pakistan was no more required in their game.

- Anti-Americanism in Pakistan has a complex dynamic. It is framed by four concentric circles: general reaction to U.S. might and power, America's current international conduct, relations between Islam and the West, and the history of U.S.-Pakistan relations. Indeed, as the most powerful and arrogant nation on earth, the United States provokes envy and resentment around the world. As for America's international conduct, its legitimacy and self-centeredness have been under challenge, especially after September 11. Regarding Islam and the West, the picture is even more complex.
- An historic look at present U.S. policies toward India and Pakistan clearly indicates a shift in U.S. policy towards India. President Bush, during his visit to Pakistan in March 2006, rejected Pakistan's request for provision of nuclear technology for civilian purpose similar to US-Indo nuclear agreement on the pretext that India and Pakistan share different historical records clearly shows that the equation between these three countries is changing. It also reflects that the United States, despite referring to Pakistan as the most important ally and President Musharraf as a buddy, can not see Pakistan with latest technology and alternate source of energy through civilian nuclear means. The United States' disenchantment with Pakistan indicates that it's just a matter of time before the future course of Pakistan's relations with the United States is decided.<sup>45</sup> (And it seems that once again we are drifting towards estrangements).

The discussion above testifies that US-Pakistan relations have never been based on the convergence of common interests rather convenience to

America's national interests. When the US required U2 surveillance flight facilities and an intelligence base against the Soviets, backdoor diplomacy with the Chinese, overt operations against the Red Army in Afghanistan, change of Taliban Regime in Afghanistan and recently the war against terrorism, it has extended its best hand forward. Consequently, American support to Pakistan was forthcoming in terms of military and economic aid as well as support for military dictators. Pakistan during this time has had modest success in getting economic aid from the US and injections from the World Bank and IMF. However, all of these spells of engagements have been predicated to the realization of American interests. Every short spell of engagement has brought a long period of estrangement full of suffering, and resentment for Pakistan.

Seeing the U.S. past record, and swiftly changing events of our current engagement with US, it seems most likely that history is about to replicate itself. In the quest for securing its strategic assets and revival of its economy, Pakistan has lost its sovereignty and security both. Instead of Pakistan getting reward and recognition for its services, she has been subjected to severe imbalance of power by nuclear cooperation and strategic partnership with India. Today Pakistan is standing on cross roads and seems to be moving rapidly towards water shed. Today, neither our frontiers or our sovereignty is safe nor state structure is functioning. Our confidence over our nuclear deterrence is sinking on the one hand, and Kashmir is slipping out of our hands on the other. Our society is in a mess, suicide bombing, sectarian violence, rampant corruption, loot sale of state assets in the name of privatization, secularization of education as well as state and its legislations, westernization of our culture on the pretext of enlightened moderation, political victimization and degradation of apex judicial body have

become norms of the day. While tracing causes of these maladies, US and her policies are found to have some stakes with varying degree and magnitude. It seems that US is about to leave again and we would be struck-up with the mess.

American Administration's views on the recent Judicial crisis in Pakistan confirms that issues such as the viability of Pakistan's political system have inadequate concerns for America in comparison to protecting military rule. Today, every Pakistani citizen is asking as to how long it will take the United States to file for another divorce. Resultantly, disgust towards American imperialism is rapidly increasing, and respect to its liberal democratic society is proportionately dwindling. If this downward trend is not checked immediately, then it is most likely that US may lose a sincere and honest friend in future. U.S must remember that it was Pakistan's role and sacrifices, which have made US victorious in the Cold War.

On the one hand Pakistan is loudly credited for her vital role in War against Terrorism and on the other she is denied the right to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purpose, as has been granted to India. While denying the same privilege to Pakistan Bush underlined that Pakistan was still a frontline state for US. It is presumed that Pakistan would fight against radical Islam and bring reforms in Middle East. However, Pakistan could not be offered nuclear energy as it has different history. Unfortunately, he did not elaborate on what history he was referring, to the history of our sacrifices or the history of US betrayal. He showed carrot to Musharraf and stick to Pakistan and urged her to do more or be ready to suffer reduction in financial assistance. Pakistan is being pressurized on host of demands like to eliminate Taliban, bomb

your own people of tribal areas and don't negotiate for peace with them, herald the process of secularization of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, surrender Kashmir movement, alienate Jihadists, discourage the socio-political forces of integration and strengthen the forces of internal dissension, and allow American forces to hunt any one they like within the territorial boundaries of Pakistan. This all indicate return of Hobbesian state of law and not the law of humanity or morality. Unfortunately, Pakistan's experience of engagement with U.S. depicts dismal picture -lacking colours of ethical and moral foundations.

Not withstanding her past behavior one feels obliged to request U.S. to behave like an honest partner and a responsible international player contributing to international order and socio-political justice.

It is important to note that what President Bush has termed "the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women, private property, equal justice, religious tolerance" – are not narrow American values but are in fact universal values and people everywhere would like to benefit from them. The whole world is still waiting to see Bush live-up to his commitment:

*"It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world."*<sup>46</sup>

**Annexure-A**

**PAKISTAN SPECIFIC U.S. LEGISLATIONS**

**Symington Amendment:** *Adopted 1976. Sec. 101 of the Arms Export Control Act, formerly Sec. 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended.*

Prohibits most U.S. assistance to any country found trafficking in nuclear enrichment equipment or technology outside of international safeguards. President Jimmy Carter found Pakistan in violation of the Symington amendment in 1979 because of Islamabad's construction of a uranium enrichment plant. U.S. aid to Islamabad was possible between 1982 and 1990 only through the use of presidential waivers.

**Glenn Amendment:** *Adopted 1977. Sec. 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, formerly Sec. 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended.*

Prohibits U.S. foreign assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon state (as defined by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) that, among other things, detonates a nuclear explosive device. President Bill Clinton imposed Glenn amendment sanctions against India on May 13, 1998, on its nuclear explosion of 11<sup>th</sup> May. President Clinton invoked similar sanctions against Pakistan on May 30, 1998, following Islamabad's retaliatory detonation on 28<sup>th</sup> May.

**Pressler Amendment:** *Enacted in 1985. Sec. 620E[e] of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended.*

The Pressler Amendment stipulated that most military and economic assistance to Pakistan could only be authorized after an annual certification by the U.S. president that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the provision of U.S. aid would significantly



reduce the risk of Pakistan possessing such a device. The President George H.W. Bush did not offer certification in 1990, resulting into a series of punitive measures including banning most of the economic and military assistance to Pakistan. Pressler amendment prohibitions damaged the most to U.S.-Pakistan relations.

**Brownback I:** *Adopted 1998. The India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998, incorporated into the fiscal 1999 omnibus appropriations bill (Public Law 105-277).*

Provides the president with authority to waive, for a period of one year, Glenn, Symington and Pressler amendment sanctions on India and Pakistan, except for those pertaining to military assistance, dual-use exports and military sales.

**Brownback II:** *Adopted 1999. Incorporated into the fiscal year 2000 defense appropriations bill (Public Law 106-79).*

The president was authorized to waive off provisions of the Glenn, Symington and Pressler amendments with respect to India and Pakistan. It States that the broad application" of export controls on Indian and Pakistani government agencies and private companies suspected of having links to their country's nuclear or missile programs is "inconsistent" with the national security interests of the United States, and urges the application of U.S. export controls only against agencies and companies that make "direct and material contributions to weapons of mass destruction and missile programs and only to those items that can contribute to such programs.<sup>47</sup>

**October 1999- "Democracy Sanctions:** After Musharraf's October 12, 1999, coup, Congress invoked Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act, prohibiting all U.S. economic and military aid toward Pakistan.

***Post 9/11 Waivers:*** President George W. Bush waived the Glenn, Symington, and Pressler sanctions under the authority given to him by the legislation known as Brownback II. Congress voted to allow President Bush to waive the "democracy sanctions" imposed on Pakistan through September 30, 2003. These democracy sanctions have since been waived annually.

***December 2004: Ackerman Amendment:*** This amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act requires the CIA, over a five-year period, to make annual reports to Congress about Pakistan's nuclear activities, democratic development, and counter terror efforts.

## End Notes

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