

Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Pak-Afghan Relations After 9/11

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Abstract

The attacks on World Trade Centre (WTC) and Pentagon on 11 September which killed around 3000 civilians and caused material loss of more than hundred billion dollars was simply tragic. The attacks brought about not only a "seismic shift in international relations" but also forced Pakistan to change its policy towards the Taliban regime and emerged as Front Line state in War against terrorism. The event of 9/11 brought the war-torn Afghanistan to the lime light of global politics. The US authorities were adamant to bring to justice the perpetrators of the heinous crime. In its 'crusade' against the mastermind of the terrorist attacks, the US President George W. Bush asked the world community that there couldn't be any neutral in the war against terrorism. Pakistan, due to its geographical location and its 'special relations' with the Taliban became the focus of US strategy to isolate al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan. The world in general and Pakistan in particular was given a choice by US authorities, "either to be with us or against us" in its fight against the Global War on Terror (GOWT). After Taliban and al-Qaeda rout in Afghanistan in the wake of US-led operation, most of them fled to Pakistan's Tribal Area. In the wake of 9/11 and the subsequent US-led Operation Endurance Freedom by the US led coalition against the Taliban regime, FATA was catapulted to the center stage of world politics. In addition to its physical proximity to Afghanistan, social and ethnic bonds, the faulty legal system of the area rendered it to be the meeting-point of the fleeing Taliban and the al-Qaeda. Since 2002 Pakistan launched many military operations against the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other foreign elements in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan with many peace deals but peace remained elusive. This paper will look into the problem that how the status of Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) is responsible for the resurgence of Taliban and deterioration of Pak-Afghan relations particularly after the event of 9/11.

Keywords: Pak-Afghan relations; FATA, 9/11; Pakistan army; Durand line; Taliban; War on terror

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Introduction

Like the Durand Line (drawn in 1893),¹ Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)² is also a symbol of British colonialism. Pakistan claiming to be the successor of British India retained it so far with only cosmetic changes in its status. When British brought Tribal Area in their sphere of influence, the Afghan Amir, Abdur Rahman had warned that the people of this area would cause trouble in the region if they were taken out of his control. However, the British disregarded his opinion and established FATA.

Britain created FATA for its own reasons to contain the Tsarist Russia³ and afterwards Soviet Union. FATA was used by the British as a “buffer to the buffer (Afghanistan)”.⁴ It has an area of 10,500 sq miles (27,220 sq km) sharing about 300 miles of the Durand Line border with Afghanistan.⁵ The officially estimated population of FATA is 3.5 million out of total 170 million population of Pakistan. Administratively, the Tribal Area consists of seven agencies and six Frontier Regions (FRs).⁶ It is being run through a special set of Regulations known as Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). The governor of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa exercises authority on behalf of Pakistan’s President. The president exercises discretionary powers in 1973 Constitution to make regulations with regard to FATA.⁷

As a result of the partition of the Indo-Pak sub-continent in August 1947, majority of the Tribal *Maliks* (elders) joined Pakistan. However, to the disappointment and detriment of the tribal, they were kept in thralldom by successive Pakistani governments under the dreaded British-made Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), since its promulgation in 1872 though with slight amendments in 1878, 1901 and in 2012.⁸

FCR: Root cause of the Problem

FCR is in contradiction with Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution. According to Article 8 of the Constitution which guarantees fundamental rights to all the citizens of Pakistan are denied by the FCR. Under FCR an accused person has no right to the higher judiciary of the country. This cruel law has been vociferously criticized by the human rights watchdogs and activists. Nonetheless, Pakistan continued with this federally controlled dispensation under the pretext of calling it in line with the customs and traditions of the Pakhtuns living in the area. This is however, ironical that if FCR is compatible with the traditions of tribesmen then it must be in line with the conducts of all Pakhtuns, because

all Pakhtuns are bound up by the same code of life known as *Pakhtunwali*.

FCR has heavily told upon the educational, economic, political and legal conditions of denizen of FATA.⁹ A big slice of the developmental funds are misappropriated by the political administration. The awfully low percentage of education¹⁰ can be understood from the male and female literacy rate which is hardly 17 and 3 percent as compared to the national average of 40 and 32 percent respectively.¹¹ The non-existence of the state-of-the-art health facilities also constitutes one of the big problems of the tribesmen. Around 66 percent people live below the poverty line. Such deprivations make a section of the tribal people vulnerable to extremism. Under the FCE the Political Agent and his administration enjoy vast judicial power making them the true replica of the dictum that absolute power corrupts absolutely. Which in turn make the people alienated and they indulge in unhealthy activities.

Pakistan's Military Operations in FATA and Pak-Afghan Relations

US blamed Al-Qaeda and Taliban for the tragic event of 9/11. USA demanded unconditional surrender of Osama bin Laden who was based in Taliban Afghanistan. The administration warned the whole world either they are with the US or not. Pakistan being part of the world community also sided with the US in its Global War on Terror (GWOT). Within a short span of time the stubborn Taliban were thrown out of power. The remnants of the Taliban melted into the neighboring Pakhtun populated areas, particularly FATA.

In 2002 Pakistan launched military operations against the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other foreign elements in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan.¹² Again Pakistan launched a military operation in South Waziristan on 16 March 2004; the operations resulted in the death of about 160 civilian and military men including some foreign combatants. The operation ended on the abortive Shakai Agreement with militant commander Nek Muhammad.¹³ Similarly Pakistan started operations one after the other in the tribal areas with peace remained elusive leading to signing of similar agreements. On September 5, 2006, Pakistan signed another agreement with seven Pakistani Taliban leaders in North Waziristan.¹⁴ The Agreement provided that attacks on Afghan, Pakistani and US forces would come to an end. In return the army would withdraw its garrisons and checkpoints, release all

prisoners, return captured vehicles and equipment and would compensate those tribesmen who had suffered losses. However, the Agreements produced exactly the reverse results. The agreement further exacerbated the situation for the US and Afghan forces as attacks against them were intensified. The Afghan government “criticized...the agreement...malicious and dubious in nature.”¹⁵ US and its allies had been critical of Pakistan’s accords with militants/Taliban and seen them as “unworkable instrument of persuasion.”¹⁶ Their criticism originates from the fact that rather than restraining the Taliban these accords further empowered them.

Hafiz Gul Bahader¹⁷ and Maulana Sadiq Noor¹⁸ led-Taliban totally disregarded the main provisions of the Accord which barred them from entering Afghanistan for fighting against Afghan and US-led coalition forces and setting up parallel administration. After signing the Agreement the Taliban started using the Alizia Pass in Kurrum Agency. The Taliban signed the Agreement not because they were defeated but because they were over-engaged in Afghanistan.¹⁹ Soon after the Pakistan and Taliban Agreement US and ISAF officials claimed that there was a marked increase from across the border.²⁰

A sort of propaganda was carried out from FATA was also used by Al-Qaeda and Taliban for “producing dozens of high-quality video and audio tapes...and offering them a public forum for speaking out.” “FATA became a multilayered terrorist cake.”²¹ It was alleged that Pakistan wanted to create a ‘Talibanized belt’ to keep pressure on any pro-India regime in Afghanistan and to keep US and allies troops dependent on Pakistani goodwill. In June 2002 a US official told Ahmed Rashid, an authority on Afghanistan, about the presence of about 35,000 al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters on Pakistani soil it turned a blind eye toward them.²² A former air force general and head of the CIA, Michael Hayden also corroborated that “...Today virtually every major terrorist threat that my agency is aware of has threads way back to [Pakistan’s] tribal area.”²³ FATA has been used to train operatives to carry out operations even outside South Asia.²⁴

Afghan as well as US, NATO and UN officials in their interviews in Afghanistan from 2004, 2005, 2006, revealed that “the Taliban, Hizb-i-Islami of Gulbadin Hekmatyar, al-Qaeda and other insurgent groups used Tribal Area as a sanctuary with ISI “...to provide assistance to Afghan insurgent groups.”²⁵ This was also confirmed by a member of the Afghan Parliament (*Wolesi Jirga*), Ms. Shenkai Karrokhail.²⁶ According to Rubin, an expert

on Afghanistan “there certainly is, in Pakistan, obvious infrastructure of support for the insurgency...which includes madrassas, training camps, recruitment, videos and digital video disk [DVDs] that are sold openly and so on.”²⁷ Despite Pakistan’s President Musharraf’s repeated pronouncements to reassure the world of Pakistan’s radical policy change with regard to Islamists and Jihadi however, the Musharraf government tolerated Taliban’s presence under the hope that they would be used to retain Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan.²⁸ According the “Afghan War Dairy” leaked by *Wiki Leaks* on 25 July 2010, which contained 92000 reports from January 2004 to December 2009 revealed that Pakistan’s military and ISI supported the Taliban.²⁹

Suggestion for Fencing and Mining the Durand Line by Pakistan

In order to stop allegation against Pakistan’s support for Taliban it called for the fencing and mining of the Durand Line between the two countries to address the issue of cross border terrorism. Pakistan’s interior minister, Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao, has said that “Islamabad is considering fencing the Durand Line and planting landmines on its side of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to stop infiltration of people and contraband”. He further told that:

“There is no writ of the government in some provinces of Afghanistan bordering Pakistan. And instead of tackling the situation, the Afghan government is falsely accusing Pakistan of cross-border infiltration to hide its own weaknesses.”³⁰

In September 2005³¹ in order to show Pakistan sincerity in the war against terror President Musharraf suggested US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice for fencing and mining the Durand Line.³² It was again pointed out during a meeting with US Central Command Chief (Centcom), General John P. Abizaid, that Afghanistan need to take steps to strengthen security on its side of the Durand Line to stop ‘miscreants’ crossing into Pakistan’s tribal areas. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Khurshid Kasuri, also told journalists in Afghanistan that Pakistan was fed with Afghan accusation and wanted to fence the Durand Line. However, Afghanistan did not approve of fencing the Line³³ as it would “merely divide families already split by the British-drawn frontier.”³⁴ The “people needed to be brought closer rather than pulled apart, which is what the fence would do.”³⁵

Afghan President said that he would use every method to stop mines being planted on the border because the laying of mines

was not going to get us anywhere.³⁶ Afghan interior ministry spokesman Lutfullah Mashaal also told Afghan News Agency *Pazhwak* that the Durand Line was disputed and unless border was determined in accordance with international law the proposal of fencing and mining the Durand Line could not be accepted. However, he suggested for joint Pak-Afghan commission to monitor the Line.³⁷ It was inferred that from Afghanistan's refusal to fence and mine the Durand Line because it wanted to keep the issue of the legitimacy of the Durand Line open. It is obvious that if border was fenced, the Line would put a stamp on its legality.³⁸ Some experts also opposed the idea of mining as it could produce opposite results. These experts cited the example of Bosnia, Cambodia and Peru in this regard where the local people dug out mines and then sold.³⁹

President Hamid Karzai visited Pakistan on 15 to 17, February 2006. Before his visit President Karzai was quoted as saying:

*"I am going to Pakistan especially to talk with the President of Pakistan and the government there about the issue of terrorism, ...I will talk to them about these bombings going on in places like Kandahar, Paktia Province, Khost, and Mazar-e Sharif."*⁴⁰

*"The prosperity that peace would bring to Afghanistan would benefit its neighbor...the poorer, the more troubled Afghanistan..."*⁴¹

As a goodwill gesture Pakistan freed 562 nationals arrested under the foreigners Act on the eve of the visit.⁴² Insiders claim that though the trip resulted in "the usual mutual ceremonial vows of friendship and cooperation" yet "most of the official meetings ended on either a bitter or stale note because of the contentious issues raised by both sides."⁴³

Prime amongst these issues were Kabul's allegation about the Taliban and Al-Qaeda presence in Pakistani territories and Pakistan shared intelligence with President Karzai on weapon smuggling into Balochistan. Pakistan also raised the issue at the tripartite Commission's meeting on Kabul on 25 February 2006.⁴⁴ And concerns about Indian consulates based in Afghanistan and their role in funding and arming the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) in Balochistan.⁴⁵ During President Karzai's visit, Islamabad is reported to have had provided proof to the Afghan President of the role of the Indian consulates in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Mazar-e-

Sharif and Herat in fueling violence in Pakistan especially Balochistan. Meanwhile, the main message by President Karzai was that Pakistan was not doing enough to address to Kabul's concern regarding the alleged presence of terrorists in its territory.⁴⁶ The Afghan delegation handed over a list of wanted Taliban officials including Mullah Omar, whom they claimed were in Pakistan. Upon his returning to Kabul expressed the hope that Pakistan would take action on the list given to it.⁴⁷ The list given to Pakistani authorities was disclosed to the media, provoking a rebuke from the Pakistani President, General Musharraf, in his interviews with the US television networks ABC and CNN, that the information provided to Pakistan on Taliban leader's presence on Pakistani soil was "a waste of time as most of it was outdated and that the CIA knew about this." During his interview with the CNN he said,

*"I am really surprised and shocked why they have disclosed this to the media...there is a very, very deliberate attempt to malign Pakistan' by some agents, and President Karzai is totally oblivious of what is happening in his own country."*⁴⁸

It was taken by Musharraf as a shifting of blame to Pakistan.

*"Who the hell is doing anything if Pakistan is not doing enough?... is [Afghan President Hamid Karzai] doing something?... The whole country side is rampant with Taliban today, the south of Afghanistan. The Afghan Government and allied forces had better act there."*⁴⁹

On 24 May 2005 Pakistani security forces arrested six Afghans, from the District Loralai (Baluchistan), for illegally crossing into Pakistan. Out of the six arrested, one was reportedly a member of the Afghan Provincial Assembly, and the other two were security personnel. They were suspected of supplying weapons to the Baloch insurgents in Pakistan.⁵⁰ The Afghan President Karzai renewed his criticism that Mullah Omar was in Pakistan's, intelligence gave military training to the people and sent them to Afghanistan with the logistics. Pakistan foreign office spokesperson rejected Karzai allegations as baseless.⁵¹ He said that gone were the day when road to Kabul run through Islamabad.⁵² Pakistan prime minister and Afghan President met in Baku in May 2006. The two leaders agreed to have regular and frequent consultations at various levels including the foreign ministers levels.⁵³ Afghan Foreign Minister Rangeen Dadfar Spanta's visited Pakistan in June 2006 and met his Pakistani counterpart Khurshid

Mahmud Kasuri. During Spanta's visit several decisions on intelligence sharing and modalities for security cooperation were taken.⁵⁴ Relations between the two states continued to suffer as both the states blame each other for cross-border infiltration.

Conclusion

Pak-Afghan relations since 9/11 continue to wax and wane. But the most important theme during all this time was the cross border infiltration by the Taliban. The Taliban cross border movements across the porous Durand Line became one of the most intricate issues between Pak-Afghan relations as the Taliban not only carried out attacks against the Afghan government, US, NATO and ISAF but those Taliban who fled in the wake of Pakistan's military operations in the Tribal Areas and Swat District also carried out attacks on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line as they did in Bajaur and Mohmand Tribal Agencies, District Dir.⁵⁵ and Chitral.⁵⁶

Despite the goodwill gestures on the part of Pakistan in the shape of aid to Afghanistan for its reconstruction and above all the deployment of more than eighty thousand regular troops along the Durand Line to check infiltration by the militants, Afghan authorities remained skeptical of Pakistani efforts and continued urge Pakistan 'to do more' against the terrorists. There is a deep trust deficit between the two countries. This deficit has its roots not only in the past but this also emanates from a threat the wrong policies pursued by Pakistan and Afghanistan since the creation of the former in 1947.

Notes & References

¹ Which according to Afghans was a Treaty under “duress”, but for Pakistan is *fait accompli*.

² FATA is composed of seven Agencies and six Frontier Regions (FRs). The seven Agencies are Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Kurrum, Orakzai, North Waziristan and South Waziristan. And six Frontier Regions are FR Peshawar, FR Kohat, FR Bannu, FR Lakki, FR Tank and FR Dera Ismail Khan (D I Khan). Fata has a total area of 27, 200 sq. Km and officially its population is 3.5 million. However it is estimated population is stated to be more than 60 million. FATA is run under a special set of laws known as Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), initially enacted in 1872 in Punjab. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, “Political Reforms in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA): Will it End the Current Militancy?” *South Asian and Comparative Politics* Working Paper No. 64. January 2012; Toor Gul Chamkani, *Qabayal Tareekh ke Ayene me* (Urdu) (Peshawar: Peshawar Pashtu Adabi Jirga, 2005), 15. See for detail Sher Muhammad Mohmand, *FATA: A Socio-Cultural and Geo-Political History* (n, pn., 2003).

³ “Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants” *International Crises Group* Asia Report No. 125 (2006): 5

⁴ Hanif-ur-Rahman, “Why FATA is a Hub of Terrorism” *The Frontier Post*, November 7, 2009.

⁵ Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, “Political Reforms in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA), op.cit., 3

⁶ Three Agencies were formed after the creation of Pakistan that are Mohmand Agency in 1951, Orakzai and Bajaur Agencies in 1973.

“Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants”, op.cit., 5.

⁷ Article 247 (5) of the constitution states that the “President may make regulations for the peace and good governance of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas”. Article 247 (6) notes that the “President may be ordered direct neither that whole nor any part shall cease to be the Tribal area with the consultation of a Tribal Jirga”. *The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan* (Islamabad: Ministry of Law, Justice and Human Rights, 2004), 146-7. “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants”, op.cit., 4.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ The area has the lowest human development indicators in Pakistan and especially after 9/11 has suffered more due to the prolonged armed conflict. The war on terror destroyed most of the roads and mobile phone service, where it works, has been stopped, and educational institutions closed or turned in barracks for troops stationing. And there has been constant curfew in many Parts of FATA. Tahir Ali, “The Crippled FATA Economy”, *Dawn*, November 16, 2009. Ihsan Dawar, *The Daily Mashriq* (Urdu), August 16, 2007; Javid Aziz Khan “Changing the fate of FATA” *The News*, August 19, 2007.

¹⁰ According to World Bank survey Fata is the most backward area in term of literacy. Literacy rate is 16.10 percent. There is a glaring discrepancy between male female literacy rate with male having 28.60 and female education ratio is 2-10. Aqeel Yousafzai, *Talibanization: Afghanistan se FATA, Swat Aur Pakistan tak* (Negarashat Publishers, 2009), 108.

¹¹ Khalid Aziz, "Agenda for FATA Reforms" *The Statesman* (Peshawar) July 11, 2008.

¹² Shabana Fayyaz, "Towards A Durable Peace in Waziristan" *Pakistan Security Research Unit* Brief No 10, April 2007; "The first military operation by the army was conducted in a village in South Waziristan along the Durand Line in June 2002. The army...entered a village in the vicinity of Azam Warsak in the agency." Farhat Taj, *Taliban and Anti-Taliban* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing), 87.

¹³ Ikram Sehgal, "Jihad against Terrorism". Available at: <http://www.defencejournal.com/2003/mar/jihad.htm>

¹⁴ Between 2004 and 2006, the government of Pakistan entered into a series of peace agreements with various local Taliban factions. Shakia Peace Agreement (April 2004), Agreement with Yargulkhel, Kurmezkhel, and Malkhel, Sub Sections of the Ahmedzai Wazir Tribe (2004), Sararogha Peace Agreements (February 2005), and North Waziristan Peace Agreement (September 2006). The aim of these agreements was to bind the tribes to renounce sanctuaries to foreign militants, stop cross-border armed activities in Afghanistan, incursions into the settled districts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and accept the writ of the government. The government on its own had to scale down its operations. However, in each and every case the agreements were not strictly adhered to rather openly flouted. Taking advantage of the lull in the military operations, the Pakistani Taliban set up parallel administration in areas of their control and virtually imposed Taliban style rule in their areas. Arabinda Acharya et al, "Making Money in the Mayhem: Funding Taliban insurrections in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan" *Current Affairs Digest* (Monthly), Book No, 179, (Lahore: A.H. Publishers, July 2009), 48-9.

¹⁵ Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into chaos: The US and the disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia* (New York: Penguin, 2008), 277.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Hafiz Gul Bahadur belongs to the Madda Khel sub tribe of the Uthmanzai Wazir Tribe. He was born in the village of Lwara, bordering Afghanistan, in North Waziristan Agency. He received his religious education from a Deobandi Madrasah in Multan (Punjab). He took part in Afghan Jihad and again fought along the Taliban during their rule. He is known for hoisting al-Qaeda and cross-border Haqqani networks. He agreed to the North Waziristan Peace Agreement with Pakistani government signed in September 2006 but broke down in 2007. He was

chosen as the deputy head of the Tahrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which was formed in December 2007. However, he soon distanced himself from the TTP and asked the Pakistani Taliban to focus on only Afghanistan. Sadia Sulaiman, "Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban" *Terrorism Monitor*, Volume No. 7 Issue. 9. Available at:

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34839&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=412&no_cache=1, See also Imtiaz Gul, *The Al-Qaeda Connection: The Taliban and Terror in Pakistan's Tribal Areas* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2009), 184-5.

¹⁸Mafulana Sadiq Noor is from the small village of Khati-Kalay along the Tochi River in North Waziristan. He belongs to the Dawer Tribe. He fought alongside the Taliban against the United Front. Pakistani authorities started an operation against him as he was suspected of hosting Uzbeks and Arab fighters. However, after the military operation in 2007 he ceased support to foreign fighters and started 'cooperating' with security forces. He is believed to have close links with Pakistani security forces. *Ibid.*, 183-4.

¹⁹Intikhab Amir, "The Velvet Fist Revealed" *The Herald* Volume 37, Number 11, (November, 2006): 52-57.

²⁰Daniel Markey, "A False Choice in Pakistan" *Foreign Affairs*, Volume. 86. Number, 4 (July-August 2007): 91.

²¹Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into chaos: The US and the disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*, *op.cit.*, 265.

²²*Ibid.*, 267-8.

²³Brain Cloughley, "Pakistan's Terrorist confrontation" *The Daily Times* November 19, 2008.

²⁴Bruce Riedel, "Disrupt Al Qaeda's Core", Brookings Institute.

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²⁶Interview with Shenkai Karrokhail, March 28, 2012, Islamabad.

²⁷*Ibid.*

²⁸Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010), 2.

²⁹Jameel Marghuz, "WikiLeaks-Pas-e-PardaMuharikat" *Daily Aaj* (urdu), August 9, 2010.

³⁰*Ibid.*, "Mr. Karzai Can't Have it Both Ways," *Daily Times*, March 12, 2006. Available at:

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- ³² *Dawn*, 13 September 2005.
- ³³ Rizwan Zeb, "Cross Border Terrorism Issues Plaguing Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations", *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Volume 4, Number 2 (2006): 78.
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- ³⁵ Ishtiaq Ahmad, "Rescuing Pak-Afghan Relations" *Pulse* (Weekly) February 23-March 1, 2007
- ³⁶ M. Saleem Shahid, "Borders is right", *Pakistan Observer*, January 18, 2007.
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- ³⁹ Zalan Momand, "Azghan Tar A Minenona-Asel Maqsad", *Pukhtun*, Volume 3, Number 2 (2007).
- ⁴⁰ Rizwan Zeb, "Cross Border Terrorism Issues Plaguing Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations", loc.cit.
- ⁴¹ Baber Shah, "Pakistan, India and the Post 9/11 Afghanistan" *Central Asia* No. 57, (winter, 2005): 344.
- ⁴² Foreign Office Yearly Book (2005-06): 16.
- ⁴³ Imtiaz Gul, "Karzai's Visit and Continuing Acrimony," *The News International*. Available at: www.jang.com.pk/thenews/feb2006-daily/23-02-2006/oped/o3.htm
- ⁴⁴ M. Saleem Shahid, "Borders is right", op.cit.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid.
- ⁴⁶ Ron Synovitz, "Afghanistan: Karzai To Consult Pakistan About Suicide Bombings," RFE/RL, February 15 2006. Available at: www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/02/A645C166-D11D-48BC-ADBA-454787683128.html
- ⁴⁷ *Dawn*, Islamabad, February 18, 2006.
- ⁴⁸ Rizwan Zeb, "Cross Border Terrorism Issues Plaguing Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations", op.cit. See also "Musharraf Says Karzai Oblivious" *BBC News* March 6, 2006, Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4777610.stm
- ⁴⁹ "Afghanistan: the Challenge", op.cit.
- ⁵⁰ Zeb, "Cross Border Terrorism Issues Plaguing Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations", loc.cit.
- ⁵¹ *Dawn*, May 20, 2006.
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- ⁵³ Foreign Office Yearly Book (2005-06), 16
- ⁵⁴ ibid.
- ⁵⁵ On April 21 and on June 1 Taliban attacked Kharki border post in Lower Dir in which 16 security personnel were killed. Again on June 1 a Pakistani check post in the Shaltalo area of Dir upper a deadly attack was

carried out that killed 28 policemen and another six civilian. *The News*, June 2, 2011. See also Rahimullah Yusufzia, "TTP Shifts Bases to Afghanistan to Launch Attacks in Pakistan", *The News*, July 16, 2011.

⁵⁶ Around 300 militant of the outlawed Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan attacked Chitral from Afghanistan side killing 33 Pakistani security men. Four men were reported to be taken into Afghanistan. Islamabad protested strongly with Afghan authorities on the issue. "The Chitral Incursion" "Abbottabad and Salala Attacks" *IPRI* Vol. XIV, No. 1-2, p 39. Also see Rahimullah Yusufzia, "TTP Shifts Bases to Afghanistan to Launch Attacks in Pakistan", op.cit.