

Role of Political Will in Reinstatement of Female Primary Education in War Ridden Areas of Swat, Pakistan

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Abstract

This research article embodies the evaluation of female primary education, in context of insurgency at Swat District of KPK. A sample size of 291 respondents was proportionality allocated to seven randomly selected villages. Chi-square test was used to find the association between government efforts to control insurgency with female primary education at bivariate level. The result found an increase in number of female teachers at girl's schools after control of security forces in the area. Whereas, all of the schools closed or damaged by insurgents in research area were reopened, similarly, all the girls that left these schools during insurgency started coming back to school. The association test results show that female education is significantly associated with, intelligence services in anti-insurgency endeavor ($P = 0.001$), special measures adopted for protection of schools ($P = 0.000$), dialogue for peace between government and insurgents ($P = 0.000$), keeping an eye on suspected insurgent ($P = 0.000$), strong partnership between law enforcement agencies and school administration ($P = 0.000$), sufficiency of existing security system ($P = 0.009$), provision of security to children on their way ($P = 0.010$). The study concluded with a significant role of government will in controlling insurgency. It is recommended to keep a check on insurgent's activities, Strengthening the security system of educational institutions by providing equipped security staff to schools, and to students and teachers/ staff on their way to schools.

Keywords: Female education; Insurgency; Political will; Swat

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Introduction

Insurgency is a planned moment to overthrow the constituted government through armed conflict.¹ The main theme involved in the insurgency is to combine continuity in enduring essence and a shifting nature, the main essence is protracted violence, political, legal ambiguity and the use of complex ways, psychological warfare and also political mobilization. This is usually done when there is instability and a group wants to take benefits from the bad situation.²

Insurgency is highly controversial in its definition because of moral relativity such as, one man might be a terrorist and the other as a freedom fighter. The main difference in the definition is that, the violence may be unlawful according to the victim status, while in the neutral observers view the cause by which those acts are committed may represent positive results.³

Historically insurgency was associated with small non-government groups of France during 19th century who used insurgent's tactics against government. The 19th century besides technological development saw the powerful fire power of the state and terrorist, this can be very clearly seen in the assassination of the Russian Tsar and U.S. president. In the mid-19th century the people's belief was that the reforms are impossible without violence. The anarchists mobilized common people against government besides killing state officers of Russia through bombing and uses of fire arms. In the 1890s several national groups were inspired by Narodnaya Volya, against Ottoman Empire. These included the Hunchakian Revolutionary Party, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization.⁴ Moreover, Islamic militant separatist movement of Chechnya made several desperate attempts for withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya ranging taking innocent peoples and student's hostage and killing them, and destroying educational sector.⁵

Insurgency in Asia is at high, especially in post 9/11 scenario. To replace Western-control over Muslim countries, Osama bin Laden started attacks in the region through 1988 founded 'Al-Qaeda', an Islamic jihadist movement. The movement remained involved in violent jihad against U.S. military forces and U.S. embassies, claiming several lives. The terrorist attacks ranged from coordinated bombing, shooting across the cities to hijacking and bombing of aero planes, organized kidnapping and destruction of infrastructures.⁶

Pakistan remained worst affected of insurgent's activities during the last decade. After 9/11, the political, economic and social instability in Pakistan was of deep concern for U.S policy makers, due to the ousted terrorist from Afghanistan. The Pukhtoon inhabited areas in Pakistan, especially the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (KPK) remained the focal area of insurgency and war against insurgency in Pakistan. The socio-culture, ethnic affinity and economic conditions of the Pukhtun areas along the border of Afghanistan were highly exploited by Taliban Al Qaida for their vested interest; similarly Pakistani states were involved in creating Jihadi groups and Taliban for their own interests in the region. However, human atrocities against Pukhtoon multiplied hatred against U.S troops instigating locals towards armed conflict against them. Consequently, Pakistan, under international pressure took serious measures against militant at different parts of the KPK resulting in the disturbances of the political, economic and social life of the KPK.

Besides heavy life losses and economic losses, the education system in the country suffered highly due to insurgent's attacks. The militants bombed, attacked and destroyed the educational institution specially the women schools. The education system was highly shattered because of insurgency as 65% of the schools in Swat were destroyed and 35% were closed in other regions of Buner, Upper and Lower Dir, Shangla and Malakand Districts, some 150,000 students were deprived from education and almost 8,000 female teachers were unemployed.⁷ This clearly indicated a picture of the female education in the area during insurgency.

Role of Political Will in Controlling of Insurgency

Counterinsurgents often seek to generate a rapid and obvious improvement in quality of life and economic opportunity in areas where security operations are suppressing insurgent activity. The aim is for the population to see clear benefit in government control.⁸ Armed forces, police, paramilitary, and military forces perform counterinsurgency, area security, or local security operations. They advise and assist in finding, dispersing, capturing, and destroying the insurgent force. Armed forces emphasize the training of national, state, and local forces to perform essential defense functions. They aim to provide a secure environment in which developmental programs can take effect while respecting the rights and dignity of the people. These operations prevent the insurgents from attacking government-controlled areas.⁹ Failure of

dialogue between government and militants left no option to the government except to establish writ of state by use of force.

Research Methodology

The study was conducted in the district Swat, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, being worst affected of insurgency, more specifically the study was limited to seven villages namely Tighak, Khakhebanda, Totanu Bandai, Serbala, Morjani, Shagai and koond of union council Totanu Bandai having 1096 enrolled girl students at primary level. As the research involves multiple variables the suitable sample size determination is provided by Sekaran according to which a sample size of 291 suffices for a population of 1096.¹⁰ The said sample size was selected from the universe by using lottery method of simple random sampling. Parents of girl students enrolled in various schools were interviewed because of their direct concern with the issue. Bi-variate procedures includes Chi square test to find out association between dependent and independent variable.

Results and Discussion

Number of girls going to school before and after insurgency

Table 1 shows frequencies and percentage distribution of number of girls going to school before and after insurgency. Table shows that in 46 percent 2 girls were going to school before insurgency followed by 23.4 percent 1 girl going to school, 17.2 percent had 4 number of girls going to school while in 13.4 percent respondents 3 girls were going to school before insurgency. Surprisingly there is no change in their frequency and percentage of number of girls going to school after insurgency. The results are against the reports of Khan who found that thousands of students have been deprived of their education. The results help to establish that government forces are successful in establishing writ of state and resumption of normal education activities.¹¹

Table 1: Frequencies and Percentage Distribution of Respondents According to Number of Girls Going to School Before and After Insurgency

Number of girls going to school	Before insurgency	After insurgency
1	68 (23.4)	68 (23.4)
2	134 (46.0)	134 (46.0)
3	39 (13.4)	39 (13.4)
4	50 (17.2)	50 (17.2)

Total	291 (100.0)	291 (100.0)
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**Frequencies are represented by number in table and percentage proportions are represented by number in parenthesis.*

Number of girls school before and after insurgency

Table 2 show the number of girl's schools before and after insurgency. The result unveil that each corresponding village had one girl's school before insurgency with no change in their number after insurgency mean that each school remain in their original condition. The result is in contrast to the findings of Pakistan Situation Report,¹² Khan¹³ and Ali,¹⁴ who reported huge destruction and closure of girl schools in these areas. Personal observation of researcher and discussion with local communities made it evident that schools which were destroyed by the insurgents were reconstructed and more secured as before and the students go to schools without any fear. The recovery was possible due to political will of the government and its enforcement through Pakistan army.

Table 2: Frequencies and Percentage Distribution of Respondents of Girl's School Before and After Insurgency

Name of village	Number of girl's school before insurgency	Number of girl's school after insurgency
Tighak	1	1
Khakhebandai	1	1
Totanubandai	1	1
Serbala	1	1
Morjani	1	1
Shagai	1	1
Kond	1	1

Number of Teaching Staff at Girl's School Before and After Insurgency

Table 3 shows number of available teachers at girl's school before and after insurgency. Table shows that earlier to insurgency five teachers were available in 57.4 percent girl's school before insurgency, 4 teachers in 28.2 percent school and 10 teachers in 14.4 percent schools of the area before insurgency. An increase in number of teachers available in girl's school is visible in post insurgency scenario as 71.8 percent schools now have five teachers, and an even proportion of 14.4 percent schools have six or eleven teachers after insurgency. The results deny the findings of Khan¹⁵ and Ali¹⁶ who found that majority of school teachers are

rendered jobless after insurgency. the personal observation and discussion with key informants made it evident that it is the writ of government established due to security forces, that not only restored the state of education but also made those teachers disciplined that remained absent from duty in past.

Table 3: Frequencies and Percentage Distribution of Number of Teachers at Girl's School Before and After Insurgency

Number of teachers	Number of girl's schools before insurgency	Number of girl's school after insurgency
4	2 (28.2)	0 (0)
5	4 (57.4)	5 (71.2)
6	0 (0)	1 (14.4)
10	1 (14.4)	0 (0)
11	0 (0)	1 (14.4)
Total	7 (100.0)	7 (100.0)

**Frequencies are represented by number in table and percentage proportions are represented by number in parenthesis.*

Existing security services to girl's schools

Table 4 show frequencies and percentage distribution of respondents according to their perception regarding existing security system provided to girl's schools. The table shows that 49.8 percent respondents thought that protecting schools is priority area in government policy, 51.9 percent disregarded that government has deployed security staff to protect schools, 47.7 percent thought that the security staff was ready to respond to terrorist attacks on girl's school, 49.8 percent were of the opinion that the school staff was protected by security personnel on their way to school while 53.7 percent respondents disagreed that the security personnel have dialogue with insurgents to stop attacks on schools. The results are in line with Dyball¹⁷ who suggested that a good partnership between law enforcement agencies and school administration for the protection of schools from insurgents attack have positive effects in promotion of education. A high proportion of 51.9 percent respondents disbelieved that the existing security system was enough to defend schools against terrorist attacks, 52.6 percent thought that the children were protected on the way to schools by security personnel, 58.4 percent disagreed that group of people associated with perceived insurgency threats were kept under proper check by security staff while 59.1 percent respondents neglected that there was a strong partnership between law enforcement agencies and school administration for protection

and security of the schools. The results are seconded by the study of National School Safety Center¹⁸ and Callaway et al¹⁹ who asserted that safety precautions secure schools in the time of insurgency and help the students to go to school securely. Moreover, schools and communities are unprepared for large scale violence or insurgency so better security system given by the government will minimize the terrorist threat to schools and will help the students to go to their schools in secure environment.

Table 4: Frequencies and Percentage Distribution of Respondents According to Their Perception of Existing Security Services to Girl's Schools

Existing security services to girl's schools	Strongly agree	Agree	Don't know	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Government is paying special attention to protect schools from terrorist attack	83 (28.5)	62 (21.3)	5 (1.7)	0 (0)	141 (48.5)
Government has deployed security personnel to protect schools	44 (15.1)	88 (30.2)	8 (2.7)	151 (51.9)	0 (0)
The security personnel are ready to respond to terrorist attacks	1 (3)	130 (44.7)	42 (14.4)	115 (39.5)	3 (1.0)
The security personnel protect school staff on their way	0 (0)	145 (49.8)	22 (7.6)	118 (40.5)	6 (2.1)
The security personnel have a dialogue with terrorists to stop attacks on schools	1 (3)	117 (40.2)	17 (5.8)	54 (18.6)	102 (35.1)
The existing security system is sufficient to protect schools	0 (0)	125 (43.0)	15 (5.2)	131 (45.0)	20 (6.9)

against terrorist attacks					
The security staff protect children on their way to schools	0 (0)	105 (36.1)	48 (16.5)	57 (19.6)	81 (27.8)
Group of people associated with perceived insurgency threats are kept under proper check by security personnel	0 (0)	96 (33.0)	25 (8.6)	131 (45.0)	39 (13.4)
There is a strong partnership between law enforcement agencies and school administration	0 (0)	102 (35.1)	17 (5.8)	128 (44.0)	44 (15.1)

* *Frequencies are represented by number in table and percentage proportions are represented by number in parenthesis.*

Female education

Table 5 shows frequencies and percentage distribution of respondents with respect to their perception of female education. Table shows that majority of 96.2 percent respondents thoughts that due to terrorist threats girl's schools were closed, 84.9 percent believed that students should be counseled to remove the effects of terrorist threats on their mind, 78.3 percent thoughts that there was insufficient girls school in the area to educate female, 88.3 percent admitted that long term stress caused by insurgency deprive female from education. Moreover, 100.0 percent respondents agreed that the communities are afraid of sending their daughters to schools out of the fear of insurgency, 78.7 percent were concerned about insufficiency of teaching staff in the area to educate girls, 93.5 percent thought that there were insufficient security systems to protect educational institution, 90.7 percent respondents admitted that losses of earning members of family deprive the children from education, while 93.1 percent respondents thought that the parents are needed to be counseled to remove effects of terrorist threats in their mind.

Table 5: Frequencies and Percentage Distribution of Respondents According to Female Education

Female Education	Strongly agree	Agree	Don't know
Girl schools are closed due to terrorist threats	48 (16.5)	232 (79.7)	11 (3.8)
Students needs to be counseled to remove the effect of terrorist threats in their mind	108 (37.1)	139 (47.8)	44 (15.1)
There are insufficient girl schools remaining in the area to educate female	45 (15.1)	184 (63.2)	62 (21.3)
Long term stress caused by insurgency deprive female from education	104 (35.7)	153 (52.6)	34 (11.7)
The communities are afraid of sending their daughters to schools out of the fear of insurgency	160 (55.0)	131 (45.0)	0 (0)
There are insufficient education staff in the area to educate girls	116 (39.9)	113 (38.8)	62 (21.3)
There are insufficient security system to protect educational institution leading to reduction in female education	100 (34.4)	172 (59.1)	19 (6.5)
Loss of earning members of family deprive the children from education	69 (23.7)	195 (67.0)	27 (9.3)
The parents needs to be counseled to remove effect of terrorist threat in their mind	42 (14.4)	229 (78.7)	20 (6.9)

* Frequencies are represented by number in table and percentage proportions are represented by number in parenthesis.

Hypothesis Testing

For the comparison between before and after insurgency and its effects on female education the paired sample t-test is used. Various hypothesis of insurgency are given in table 6 and its results are discussed below.

Hypothesis - 1

H_0 = Number of girls going to school have not changed in pre insurgency and post insurgency scenario.

H_1 = Number of girls going to school have changed in pre insurgency and post insurgency scenario.

As shown in the table 6 a non significant difference in number of girls going to school in pre insurgency and post insurgency scenario was found. Zero value of mean difference suggests that there is no change in number of girls going to school before and after insurgency. The null hypothesis is accepted and alternate hypothesis is rejected. The result helps to authenticate the views of local communities regarding efficient security system and well developed strategies of government after insurgency and quick responses to the insurgent activities. The result also validate that the areas were cleared from insurgents and the parents feel safe to send their children to schools.

Hypothesis - 2

H₀ = Number of girl's schools in the area have not changed in pre insurgency and post insurgency scenario.

H₁ = Number of girl's schools in the area have changed in pre insurgency and post insurgency scenario.

Table 6 shows a non significant difference in number of girl's schools before and after insurgency. Zero value of mean difference points to the fact that there is no change in the number of schools in the area, in the context of insurgency. The null hypothesis is accepted and alternate hypothesis is rejected. It is safe to validate the personal observation of the researcher from these results, as all of the available schools in the area, either were not harmed by insurgents or were timely repaired by government / military establishment, which speaks of efficiency on part of government agencies / security forces.

Hypothesis - 3

H₀ = Numbers of available teachers at girl's schools have not changed in pre insurgency and post insurgency scenario.

H₁ = Numbers of available teachers at girl's schools have changed in pre insurgency and post insurgency scenario.

As shown in table 6 a highly significant (P=0.000) difference in number of available teachers at girl's schools in context of insurgency was found. As the value is less than 0.05 for 95% confidence interval, thus the null hypothesis is rejected and an established relationship is confirmed between changes in number of available teachers at girl's school after insurgency. A mean difference value of -0.56 suggests increase in number of available teachers at girl's schools after insurgency. The above statement

negates the research of Human Rights Watch²⁰ that teachers of girl's school were targeted by insurgents through bombing attacks and stopping them from going to school. In fact the findings of present study and that of Human Rights Watch cannot be compared to draw valid inferences as the present study is conducted in a post insurgency scenario, when the writ of state is established and the government is willing and in commanding position to heal the damage caused, as visible from the increase in number of female teachers in the girl's schools of the area.²¹

Table 6: Paired Sample T-Test Results for Research Hypothesis Test

Statement	Before Insurgency		After Insurgency		Mean Differences	t-value	P-value
	Mean	SE	Mean	SE			
	Number of girls going to school	2.24	0.59	2.24			
Number of girl's school	1.00	0.0	1.00	0.0	0	-	-
Number of available teachers at girl's school	5.44	0.133	6.00	0.122	-0.56	-19.352	(0.000)

SE=Standard Mean

** Frequencies are represented by number in table and percentage proportions are represented by number in parenthesis,*

*** = Highly significant, * = Significant, Ns = Non Significant.*

Association between existing security services to girl's schools and female education

In a situation of insurgency, the government machinery primarily focuses on safety and security of people of effected area. Such security plans include both short term and long term initiatives on the part of security agencies. Professional security measures supplemented by involvement of local communities lead to efficient control of insurgency and protection of precious organizations.

The association results of the security intervention for protection of girl's school and female education is given in table 7. The results show a highly significant and positive ($P = 0.000$ & $\gamma = +0.259$) relationship between female education and special measures adopted for protection of schools. The results suggest that the special safety measures taken by government in form of providing vigilant security personnel in the area has positively

contributed toward betterment of female education. The above findings are supported by the finding of Dyball²² who suggest that there will be a good partnership between law enforcement agencies and school administration for the prevention of schools from insurgents attack and protect children's on their way to school. Similarly a highly significant and positive ($P = 0.000$ & $\gamma = +0.451$) relationship was found between female education and dialogue for peace between government and insurgents. It is inferred from the result that government efforts for restoration of peace in the form of dialogue with insurgents, especially in controlling losses to innocent life and property is having significant efforts on promotion of female education in the area. The relationship between keeping an eye on suspected insurgent and female education was found highly significant and negative ($P = 0.000$ & $\gamma = -0.796$). The highly significant value suggest that keeping a check on the suspected insurgents by the security personnel is having a significant role in encouragement of female education in the area. However, the high negative value of gamma is an indication that there is an insufficient check on such suspects leading to perceived deterioration of female education. Similarly a highly significant and negative ($P = 0.000$ & $\gamma = -0.625$) relationship was found between female education and a strong partnership between law enforcement agencies and school administration. It is safe to conclude from the above result that a working relationship between law enforcement agencies and school administration leads to improvement of female education. However, the high negative value of gamma makes it evident that such partnerships are rare or weak, resulting into perceived deterioration of female education. A Significant and positive ($P = 0.009$ & $\gamma = +0.443$) relationship was found between the existing security system sufficiency and female education. The result points to the fact that the security measures taken by government for protection of schools have significant effect in promotion of female education. The positive value of gamma indicates that the government is successful in providing security to schools resulting perceived improvement in female education. Similarly significant and positive ($P = 0.010$ & $\gamma = +0.211$) relationship was found between provision of security to children on their way and female education, which pertains to the fact that provision of security to children on their way to school can improve female education. The positive value of gamma makes it evident that sufficient security provided by the security personnel is encouraging girls to go to

school hence improving perception towards female education. From the study of National School Safety Center²³ and Callaway et al²⁴ it was concluded that schools and communities are unprepared for large scale violence or insurgency so by the better security system given by the government will minimize the attack on schools and will help the students to go to their schools in secure environment and safety precautions will secure schools in the time of insurgency and will help the students to go to school securely..

Conversely the association of security measures for protection of schools and female education was non significant (P = 0.169), similar non significant (P = 0.060) relationship was found between preparedness to respond to terrorist attack and female education. Moreover the association of security to school staff and female education was non significant (P = 0.262). The result suggests that these areas remain over sighted in security plans and need some improvement.

Table 7: Association between Existing Security Services to Girl’s Schools and Female Education

Existing security services to girls schools	Attitude	Female education					Total	Chi square (P value) (γ value)
		Strongly agree	Agree	Dont know	Strongly disagree	Disagree		
Government is paying special attention to protect schools from terrorist attack	Strongly agree	0 (0.0)	74 (25.4)	9 (3.1)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	83 (28.5)	χ ² = 35.7 (0.000) γ = 0.3
	Agree	1 (0.3)	56 (19.2)	5 (1.7)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	62 (21.3)	
	Dont know	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	5 (1.7)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	5 (1.7)	
	Strongly disagree	0 (0.0)	114 (39.2)	27 (9.3)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	141 (48.5)	
Government has deployed security personnel to protect schools	Strongly agree	0 (0.0)	34 (11.7)	10 (3.4)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	44 (15.1)	χ ² = 9.1 (0.169) γ = 0.1
	Agree	1 (0.3)	79 (27.1)	8 (2.7)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	88 (30.2)	
	Dont know	0 (0.0)	8 (2.7)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	8 (2.7)	
	Strongly disagree	0 (0.0)	123 (42.3)	28 (9.6)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	151 (51.9)	
The security personnel are ready to respond to terrorist attacks	Strongly agree	0 (0.0)	1 (0.3)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (0.3)	χ ² = 15.0 (0.060) γ = -0.4
	Agree	1 (0.3)	98 (33.7)	31 (10.7)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	130 (44.7)	
	Dont know	0 (0.0)	40 (13.7)	2 (0.7)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	42 (14.4)	
	Disagree	0 (0.0)	103 (35.04)	12 (4.1)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	115 (39.5)	
The security personnel protect school staff on their way	Strongly disagree	0 (0.0)	2 (0.7)	1 (0.3)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	3 (1.0)	χ ² = 7.7 (0.262) γ = 0.05
	Agree	0 (0.0)	125 (43.0)	20 (6.9)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	145 (49.8)	
	Dont know	0 (0.0)	15 (5.2)	7 (2.4)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	22 (7.6)	
	Disagree	1 (0.3)	100 (34.4)	17 (5.8)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	118 (40.5)	
The security personnel have a dialogue with terrorists to stop attacks on schools	Strongly disagree	0 (0.0)	4 (1.4)	2 (0.7)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	6 (2.1)	χ ² = 42.9 (0.000) γ = 0.4
	Strongly agree	0 (0.0)	1 (0.3)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (0.3)	
	Agree	0 (0.0)	112 (38.5)	5 (1.7)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	117 (40.2)	
	Dont know	0 (0.0)	8 (2.7)	9 (3.1)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	17 (5.8)	
The existing security system is sufficient to protect schools against terrorist attacks	Disagree	1 (0.3)	47 (16.2)	6 (2.1)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	54 (18.6)	χ ² = 17.1 (0.009) γ = 0.4
	Strongly disagree	0 (0.0)	76 (26.1)	26 (8.9)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	102 (35.1)	
	Agree	0 (0.0)	115 (39.5)	10 (3.4)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	125 (43.0)	
	Dont know	0 (0.0)	12 (4.1)	3 (1.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	15 (5.2)	
The security staff protect children on their way to schools	Disagree	1 (0.3)	105 (36.1)	25 (8.6)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	131 (45.0)	χ ² = 16.8 (0.010) γ = 0.2
	Strongly disagree	0 (0.0)	12 (4.1)	8 (2.7)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	20 (6.9)	
	Agree	0 (0.0)	89 (30.6)	16 (5.5)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	105 (36.1)	
	Dont know	0 (0.0)	48 (16.5)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	48 (16.5)	
Group of people associated with perceived insurgency threats are kept under proper check by security personnel	Disagree	0 (0.0)	47 (16.2)	10 (3.4)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	57 (19.6)	χ ² = 57.0 (0.000) γ = -0.8
	Strongly disagree	1 (0.3)	60 (20.6)	20 (6.9)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	81 (27.8)	
	Agree	0 (0.0)	59 (20.3)	37 (12.7)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	96 (33.0)	
	Dont know	0 (0.0)	23 (7.9)	2 (0.7)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	25 (8.6)	
There is a strong partnership between law enforcement agencies and school administration	Disagree	1 (0.3)	124 (42.6)	6 (2.1)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	131 (45.0)	χ ² = 37.0 (0.000) γ = -0.6
	Strongly disagree	0 (0.0)	38 (13.1)	1 (0.3)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	39 (13.4)	
	Agree	1 (0.3)	72 (24.7)	29 (10.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	102 (35.1)	
	Dont know	0 (0.0)	10 (3.4)	7 (2.4)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	17 (5.8)	
	Disagree	0 (0.0)	118 (40.5)	10 (3.4)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	128 (44.0)	χ ² = 37.0 (0.000) γ = -0.6
	Strongly disagree	0 (0.0)	44 (15.1)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	44 (15.1)	
	Agree	1 (0.3)	72 (24.7)	29 (10.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	102 (35.1)	
	Dont know	0 (0.0)	10 (3.4)	7 (2.4)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	17 (5.8)	

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*Frequencies are represented by number in table and percentage proportions are represented by number in parenthesis, ** = Highly significant, * = Significant, Ns = Non Significant*

Conclusion

It was a general opinion that the insurgency is a threat to the existence of family and children, attacks on school by terrorist caused great terror in the community, through violence. Amidst of insurgency, the government efforts were found highly significant to rebuild girl schools, reassure attendance of girl students and female teacher to a state better than before insurgency. The association results of security intervention for protection of girl's school and female education were highly significant. The findings help to include that various indicators of political will are having significant controlling effects on insurgency. Strengthening the security system of educational institutions by providing equipped security staff to schools, and to students and teachers/ staff on their way to schools were the major recommendations of the study.

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